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Is understanding explanatory or objectual?

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Abstract

Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that “objectual” understanding, i.e. the understanding we have of a large body of information, cannot be reduced to explanatory concepts. In this paper, I show that Kvanvig fails to establish this point, and then propose a framework for reducing objectual understanding to explanatory understanding.

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Correspondence to Kareem Khalifa.

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Khalifa, K. Is understanding explanatory or objectual?. Synthese 190, 1153–1171 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9886-8

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