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Ontological infidelity

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Abstract

In ethical discourse, it is common practice to distinguish between normative commitments and descriptive commitments. Normative commitments reflect what a person ought to be committed to, whereas descriptive commitments reflect what a person actually is committed to. While the normative/descriptive distinction is widely accepted as a way of talking about ethical commitments, philosophers have missed this distinction in discussing ontological commitments. In this paper, I distinguish between descriptive ontological commitments and normative ontological commitments and discuss several significant benefits of recognizing this distinction. I argue that just as the normative/descriptive distinction is important for fruitful ethical discourse, so too is it important for fruitful discourse concerning our ontological commitments. And, it constitutes a significant step towards resolving some prominent debates concerning our ontological commitments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, California State University, Long Beach, USA

    Patrick Dieveney

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  1. Patrick Dieveney
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Dieveney, P. Ontological infidelity. Synthese 165, 1–12 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9228-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9228-z

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