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Why we view the brain as a computer

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Abstract

The view that the brain is a sort of computer has functioned as a theoretical guideline both in cognitive science and, more recently, in neuroscience. But since we can view every physical system as a computer, it has been less than clear what this view amounts to. By considering in some detail a seminal study in computational neuroscience, I first suggest that neuroscientists invoke the computational outlook to explain regularities that are formulated in terms of the information content of electrical signals. I then indicate why computational theories have explanatory force with respect to these regularities:in a nutshell, they underscore correspondence relations between formal/mathematical properties of the electrical signals and formal/mathematical properties of the represented objects. I finally link my proposal to the philosophical thesis that content plays an essential role in computational taxonomy.

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  1. Departments of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 91905, Israel

    Oron Shagrir

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Shagrir, O. Why we view the brain as a computer. Synthese 153, 393–416 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9099-8

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