Abstract
According to some philosophers, computational explanation is proprietary to psychology—it does not belong in neuroscience. But neuroscientists routinely offer computational explanations of cognitive phenomena. In fact, computational explanation was initially imported from computability theory into the science of mind by neuroscientists, who justified this move on neurophysiological grounds. Establishing the legitimacy and importance of computational explanation in neuroscience is one thing; shedding light on it is another. I raise some philosophical questions pertaining to computational explanation and outline some promising answers that are being developed by a number of authors.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Adrian E.D. (1928). The basis of sensation: The action of the sense organs. Norton, New York
Anderson J.A., Pellionisz A., Rosenfeld E. (1990). Neurocomputing 2: Directions for research. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Anderson J.A., Rosenfeld E. Ed. (1988). Neurocomputing: Foundations of research. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Anderson J.A., Rosenfeld E. Ed. (1998). Talking nets: An oral history of neural networks. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Bechtel, W. (2001). Cognitive neuroscience: Relating neural mechanisms and cognition. In P. Machamer, R. Grush, & P. McLaughlin (Eds.), Theory and method in the neurosciences (pp. 81–111). University of Pittsburgh Press.
Boden, M. (1991). Horses of a different color? In W. Ramsey et al. (Eds.), Philosophy and connectionist theory (pp. 3–19). Hillsdale: LEA.
Burge T. (1986). Individualism and psychology. Philosophical Review 95, 3–45
Chalmers D.J. (1996a). Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton? Synthese 108, 310–333
Chalmers D.J. (1996b). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Churchland P.S. (1986). Neurophilosophy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Churchland P.S., Koch H., Sejnowski T. (1990). What is computational neuroscience?. In: Schwartz E.L. (eds). Computational neuroscience. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 46–55
Churchland P.S., Sejnowski T.J. (1992). The computational brain. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Copeland B.J. (1996). What is computation?. Synthese 108, 224–359
Copeland B.J. (2000). Narrow Versus Wide Mechanism: Including a Re-Examination of Turing’s Views on the Mind-Machine Issue. The Journal of Philosophy XCVI, 5–32
Crane T. (1990). The language of thought: No syntax without semantics. Mind and Language 5(3): 187–212
Craver, C. F. (forthcoming). Explaining the brain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cruse, H. (2001). The explanatory power and limits of simulation models in the neurosciences. In P. , R. Grush, & P. McLaughlin (Eds.), Theory and method in the neurosciences (pp. 138–154). University of Pittsburgh Press.
Dayan P., Abbott L.F. (2001). Theoretical neuroscience: Computational and mathematical modeling of neural systems. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Dennett D.C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Little, Brown & Co., Boston
Dennett D.C. (2003). Who’s on first? Heterophenomenology explained. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10(9–10): 19–30
Edelman G.M. (1992). Bright air, brilliant fire: On the matter of the mind. Basic Books, New York
Egan F. (1995). Computation and content. Philosophical Review 104, 181–203
Ericsson K.A. (2003). How to elicit verbal reports that provide valid unobtrusive externalization of concurrent thinking? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10, 9–10
Ericsson K.A., Simon H.A. (1993). Protocol analysis. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Feest U. (2003). Functional analysis and the autonomy of psychology. Philosophy of Science 70, 937–948
Fodor J.A. (1975). The language of thought. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Fodor, J. A. (1981). The mind–body problem. Scientific American, 244. In J. Heil (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: A guide and anthology (pp. 168–182). Oxford: Oxford University Press (Reprinted 2004).
Fodor J.A. (1998). Concepts. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Frank R.G. (1994). Instruments, nerve action, and the all-or-none principle. Osiris 9, 208–235
Freeman W.J. (2001). How brains make up their minds. Columbia Press, New York
Gallistel C.R. (1990). The organization of learning. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Gazzaniga M.S. Ed. (2000). The new cognitive neurosciences. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Gerard, R. W., & Duyff, J. W. (Eds.). (1962) Information processing in the nervous system: Volume III of the international union of physiological sciences (XXII International Congress, Leiden, 1962). Amsterdam: Excerpta Medica Foundation.
Globus G.G. (1992). Towards a noncomputational cognitive neuroscience. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 4(4): 299–310
Goldman A.I. (1997). Science, publicity, and consciousness. Philosophy of Science 64, 525–545
Grush, R. (2001). The semantic challenge to computational neuroscience. In P. Machamer, R. Grush, & P. McLaughlin (Eds.), Theory and method in the neurosciences (pp. 155–172). University of Pittsburgh Press.
Grush R. (2004). The emulation theory of representation: Motor control, imagery, and perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, 377–442
Jeffress L.A. Ed. (1951). Cerebral mechanisms in behavior. Wiley, New York
Johnson-Laird P.N. (1983). Mental models: Towards a cognitive science of language, inference and consciousness. Cambridge University Press, New York
Keeley B. (2000). Shocking lessons from electric fish: The theory and practice of multiple realizability. Philosophy of Science 67, 444–465
Lloyd D. (2002). Functional MRI and the study of human consciousness. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 14, 818–831
Lycan W. (1987). Consciousness. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Machtey, M., & Young, P. (1978). An introduction to the general theory of algorithms. New York: North Holland.
McClelland J.L., Patterson K. (2002). Rules or connections in past-tense inflections: What does the evidence rule out? Trends in Cognitive Science 6, 465–472
McCulloch W.S. (1949). The brain as a computing machine. Electrical Engineering 68, 492–497
McCulloch W.S., Pitts W.H. (1943). A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 7, 115–133
Miller G.A., Galanter E.H., Pribram K.H. (1960). Plans and the structure of behavior. Holt, New York
Newell A. (1990). Unified theories of cognition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Newell A., Simon H.A. (1972). Human problem solving. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs
Newell A., Simon H.A. (1976). Computer science as an empirical enquiry: and search. Communications of the ACM 19, 113–126
Peacocke C. (1999). Computation as involving content: A response to Egan. Mind and Language 14(2): 195–202
Perkel D.H. (1990). Computational neuroscience: Scope and structure. In: Schwartz E.L. (eds). Computational neuroscience. MIT Press, Cambrdige, MA, pp. 38–45
Piccinini G. (2003). Data from introspective reports: Upgrading from commonsense to science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10(9–10): 141–156
Piccinini G. (2004). The First computational theory of mind and brain: A close look at McCulloch and Pitts’s ‘logical calculus of ideas immanent in nervous activity’. Synthese 141(2): 175–215
Piccinini, G. (forthcoming a). Computationalism, the Church–Turing Thesis, and the Church–Turing Fallacy. Synthese.
Piccinini, G. (forthcoming b). Computational modeling vs. computational explanation: Is everything a Turing machine, and does it matter to the philosophy of mind? Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Piccinini, G. (forthcoming c). Computational explanation and mechanistic explanation of mind. In M. De Caro, F. Ferretti, & M. Marraffa (Eds.), Cartographies of the mind: The interface between philosophy and cognitive science. Dordrecth: Kluwer.
Piccinini, G. (forthcoming d). Computation without representation. Philosophical Studies.
Pinker S., Ullman M. (2002). The past-tense debate: The past and future of the past tense. Trends in Cognitive Science 6, 456–463
Pylyshyn Z.W. (1984). Computation and cognition. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Revonsuo, A. (2001). On the nature of explanation in the neurosciences. In P. Machamer, R. Grush, & P. McLaughlin (Eds.), 2001, Theory and method in the neurosciences (pp. 45–69). University of Pittsburgh Press.
Rumelhart D.E., McClelland J.M., and the PDP Research Group (1986). Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Searle J.R. (1992). The rediscovery of the mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Shagrir O. (2001). Content, computation and externalism. Mind 110(438): 369–400
Smith B.C. (2002). The foundations of computing. In: Scheutz M. (eds). Computationalism: New directions. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 23–58
Stich S. (1983). From folk psychology to cognitive science. MIT Press, Cambridge
Thomson E., Lutz A., Cosmelli D. (2005). Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers. In: Brook A., Akins K. (eds). Cognition and the brain: The philosophy and neuroscience movement. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 40–97
Varela F. (1996). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3(4): 330–349
Wolfram S. (2002). A new kind of science. Wolfram Media, Champaign, IL
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Piccinini, G. Computational explanation in neuroscience. Synthese 153, 343–353 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9096-y
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9096-y