Abstract
We construct a machine that knows its own code, at the price of not knowing its own factivity.
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Presented by Richmond Thomason
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Alexander, S.A. A Machine That Knows Its Own Code. Stud Logica 102, 567–576 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-013-9491-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-013-9491-6
Keywords
- Knowing machines
- Reinhardt’s strong mechanistic thesis
- Lucas–Penrose argument
- Kleene’s recursion theorem
- Quantified modal logic