Abstract
In this article I discuss the nature and sense of legal reasoning as reasonableness, i.e. as judgement and equilibrium between normativity and factuality, and as constant approximation between these two dimensions. By (re)phrasing the intertwinement between legal hermeneutics and the nature and function of writing, the structure of the article is constructed so that the focus is on the changes currently occurring with the so-called ‘digital revolution’: in imagining a juridical system administrated through data analysis and algorithms, some contradictions emerge, especially concerning the nature, sense and task(s) of legal hermeneutics. The current shift of paradigm should be first of all addressed starting from the grammatological nature of the revolution at stake. Only from this perspective can the shift be entirely grasped and, at the same time, only from this perspective can the methodological conundrum be deconstructed.
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Notes
On the open texture of the law see in particular [1].
The concept of horizon here refers to the remarks made in particular by Gadamer [2].
Prolusione al corso di Diritto Civile pronunziata il 15 maggio 1948 [3: 12].
[4].
[4: 226].
[4: 109].
[2: 367].
[5: 20].
[6: 10].
[2: 314].
[2: 306].
[2: 392].
See in particular on this the remarks made by Rodolfo Sacco [8]. For Sacco, there can never be an objective meaning of the normative declaration, detached from the mind of the jurist, judge and in general of the interpreter.
[5: 66 ff].
[11: 264].
[13: 279].
[1: 120 ff].
[14: 10].
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Funding was provided by EU Jean Monnet (Grant No. 587184-EPP-1-2017-1-IT-EPPJMO-MODULE—2017/2020).
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Condello, A. Interpreting and Writing the Law in Digital Society: Remarks Made on a Shift of Paradigm. Int J Semiot Law 33, 1175–1186 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09733-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09733-6