Abstract
In this essay I challenge the idea that political agency must be central to the concept of citizenship. I consider this question in relation to whether or not domesticated animals can be understood as our fellow citizens. In recent debates on this topic, both proponents and opponents of animal citizenship have taken political agency to be central to this question. I advance two main arguments against this position. First, I argue against the orthodox view that claims political agency is a requirement of citizenship. This position ignores both how citizenship is understood in practice by modern, liberal democracies, as well as the separate functions of citizenship. Further, there are no plausible ways we can consistently extend citizenship to humans regardless of intellectual ability, while denying it to domesticated animals. Nevertheless, I argue that it is important to distinguish two ways in which citizenship is enacted: Citizenship as Membership and Citizenship as Responsible, Political Agent. Domesticated animals should be understood as citizens, despite the fact that they are not responsible, political agents. Second, I challenge the view, put forward by Donaldson and Kymlicka, that animals are capable of certain forms of political agency. I argue that political agency is not crucial to whether, and how, the preferences of these animals matter for political decision-making. The upshot of my argument is that political agency matters much less to debates about the citizenship of non-human animals than both sides of this debate have been inclined to think.
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Notes
See Robert Garner and Siobhan O’Sullivan (eds.) The Political Turn in Animal Ethics (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016) and Marcel Wissenburg and David Schlosberg (eds.) Political Animals and Animal Politics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014).
Another possible motivation, which I do not address here, is to emphasize ways in which domesticated animals might be capable of fulfilling various duties or responsibilities of citizens. I am skeptical that we can hold that other animals can be morally, legally, or politically responsible for their actions. While they are capable of contributing to our societies in a variety of ways, their human guardians are ultimately responsible for their behavior. See Christopher Hinchcliffe, “Animals and the Limits of Citizenship: Zoopolis and the Concept of Citizenship”, Journal of Political Philosophy 23/3 (2015), pp. 316–319 for a criticism of the view that animals can fulfill responsibilities related to citizenship.
See Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 4–14.
By domesticated animals, I am referring to animals who live with and near humans, who are dependent on humans for their basic needs, who breed in captivity, and who are social with other humans. Companion animals, like dogs and cats, are domesticated animals, as are farmed animals, such as pigs, chickens, and cows. For a variety of reasons, I believe it is better to think of captive wild animals as falling into a distinct group of animals when thinking about their political status.
See Richard Bellamy, Citizenship: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 1, 12.
Hinchcliffe, “Animals and the Limits of Citizenship”, p. 306.
Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, p. 103. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 21.
See Bellamy, Citizenship, Chapter 2.
While many political theorists affirm this, and often write that all human beings ought to be viewed as citizens of states, many ignore the challenge that individuals with severe cognitive disabilities pose to accounts of citizenship that require one be a linguistic agent who can engage in various forms of political participation.
Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, pp. 55–57.
Bellamy offers a similar analysis of the different functions or components of citizenship. On his view, these components are (1) recognized membership in a political community, (2) the collective benefits and rights associated with membership, and (3) participation in a community’s political, economic, and social processes. Richard Bellamy, Citizenship: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 12.
Bellamy, Citizenship, p. 10.
Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, p. 103.
Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that even if we do not accept their position that domesticated animals can be political agents, they can (and should) be understood as citizens, in terms of the first two functions of citizenship. See Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, p. 58.
For an excellent defense of this claim, see Joseph Carens, The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), especially chapter 8.
Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, p. 140.
Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, p. 89.
One objection, which I do not consider here, holds that while domesticated animals are members of our society, they should not be viewed as citizens because they lack basic moral rights, and basic moral rights, in addition to social membership, is a requirement of citizenship. However, there are no ways to plausibly defend the basic moral rights of all human beings, while denying them to other animals. The view that all humans, but no non-human animals, possess moral rights has been soundly undermined in the animal rights literature. For example, see: Mylan Engel Jr. “Do Animals Have Rights and Does It Matter If They Do Not?” in M. Engel and G. Comstock (eds) The Moral Rights of Animals (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2016), pp. 39–64; Nathan Nobis, “Tom Regan on ‘Kind’ Arguments against Animal Rights and for Human Rights”, in M. Engel and G. Comstock (eds) The Moral Rights of Animals (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2016), pp. 65–80; Evelyn Pluhar, The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1995); Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004).
Even if one accepted this view, it is not clear that it would mean domesticated animals are not members of their communities. This claim is suspect at least with respect to companion animals, where many animal guardians view these animals as members of their family. It would be odd were the guardians of companion animals to hold that members of their family were not also members of the broader community in which they live.
Citizenship tests, or tests of civic competence, are sometimes administered to adults who are attempting to become citizens. These sometimes measure an individual’s proficiency in the language spoken in the state, and also test an individual’s knowledge of the history and political system of the state. For an argument against the legitimacy of these tests, see Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, pp. 55–61.
Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, p. 20.
An interesting historical precedent for thinking about citizenship for those who cannot vote comes from a Roman version of citizenship known as ‘civitas sine sufragio’ (citizenship without the vote). As Bellamy notes, this extended citizenship as a legal status to non-Romans as the Roman empire expanded. See Bellamy, Citizenship, pp. 38–39.
For example, see Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, p. 24.
While I suspect that this is, in fact, the most prevalent view, this does not mean that the interests and well-being of individuals with cognitive disabilities get the attention and resources they deserve, or that we have found adequate ways to represent their interests in the political sphere.
Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory”, Ethics 104/2 (1994), p. 353.
See Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, p. 265, n. 13; and Mark Rowlands, Can Animals be Moral? (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 240–241.
Hinchcliffe, “Animals and the Limits of Citizenship: Zoopolis and the Concept of Citizenship”, p. 308.
Hinchcliffe, “Animals and the Limits of Citizenship: Zoopolis and the Concept of Citizenship”, p. 310.
My claim is not that all of the political rights held by citizens in liberal democracies should be extended to domesticated animals. Clearly that does not make sense. Domesticated animals do not have an interest in freedom of speech or any interest in freedom of religion. Rather, my argument is that any view which claims political agency is necessary for a particular right of citizenship bears the burden of justification, when domesticated animals (or any other citizen) has the relevant interest the right protects or upholds. We see this by considering a right to political representation. Domesticated animals ought to have such a right, despite the fact that they are not political agents.
Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, p. 58.
See Anita Silvers and Leslie Francis, “Justice Through Trust: Disability and the ‘Outlier Problem’ in Social Contract Theory’, Ethics 116 (2005), pp. 40–76.
Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, p. 115.
See Rowlands, Can Animals be Moral?, pp. 3–8.
Charlotte Krol, Labrador rides Seattle bus to dog park all by herself, The Telegraph (2015, January 16). Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newsvideo/viral-video/11344090/Watch-Labrador-rides-Seattle-bus-to-dog-park-all-by-herself.html.
Lisa Wood, “More Than a Furry Companion: The Ripple Effect of Companion Animals on Neighborhood Interaction and Sense of Community”, Society and Animals 15 (2007): pp. 43–56.
Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, p. 59.
Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, p. 60.
Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, p. 60.
Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis, p. 102.
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, “Interspecies Politics: Reply to Hinchcliffe and Ladwig”, Journal of Political Philosophy 23/3 (2015), pp. 321–344.
Donaldson and Kymlicka, “Interspecies Politics”, p. 327.
Donaldson and Kymlicka, “Interspecies Politics”, p. 327.
Interestingly, this account that I have just presented appears to be the underlying motivation for paying attention to, and soliciting, the preferences, desires, and abilities of other animals of some who want to understand animals as political agents. Clemens Driessen argues that we should understand other animals as political agents because of the ways they contribute to deliberation. However, Driessen suggests the aim of this political stance ‘is to develop a sensibility for interpreting intricate nonhuman behaviours and a willingness to experiment with alternative open-ended situations in which animals may reveal new (or previously unnoticed) abilities and desires’ (91). As I read it, the disagreement with someone like Driessen, and myself, is not on whether or not humans should be open to, solicit, and respond to the desires and preferences of animals, but whether thinking of them as political agents is necessary to undertake this action.
See Donaldson and Kymlicka, “Rethinking membership and participation in an inclusive democracy: cognitive disability, children, and animals”, in Disability and Political Theory Barbara Arneil and Nancy Hirschmann (eds.) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), chapter 7.
See Alasdair Cochrane, Animal Rights Without Liberation: Applied Ethics and Human Obligations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 11.
By this I mean that no domesticated animals appear capable of reflecting on our social life and the shape and nature of our society. Some non-human animals may have some capacities to reflect on their lives. I think this is at least an open question for animals such as dolphins and the great apes. However, this does not appear to be the case for any domesticated animals.
Donaldson and Kymlicka, “Interspecies Politics”, pp. 325–328.
Robert Garner, for example, suggests a model for incorporating the interests of non-human animals into a state’s legislature, based on an appeal to the all-affected-principle, and not the claim that they are our fellow citizens. On a model like that presented by Garner—where humans are elected to represent the interests of animals in a state’s legislature—the representatives can and should be responsive to the specific desires and preferences of individual animals. See Garner, “Animals, Politics, and Democracy” in Robert Garner and Siobhan O’Sullivan (eds.) The Political Turn in Animal Ethics (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), chapter 7.
One other possibility is a more enlightened wardship model that takes the agency of domesticated animals seriously, and recognizes the importance of their preferences and desires to promote their well-being.
I would like to thank Sue Donaldson, Will Kymlicka, Claudio Lopez-Guerra, Angie Pepper, Jeff Sebo, Daniel Viehoff, and Zipporah Weisberg for helpful comments on a previous draft, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
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Hooley, D. Political Agency, Citizenship, and Non-human Animals. Res Publica 24, 509–530 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-017-9374-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-017-9374-1