Abstract
This paper focuses on the claim that luck egalitarianism is incompatible with Marxian theory because it allows for the possibility of a ‘clean path’ to capitalism. It explores the nature and structure of the clean path argument generally and critically discusses luck egalitarian versions of the argument. It contends that the Marxian theory of exploitation can meet the challenge of the clean path to capitalism argument, that luck egalitarianism and the Marxian theory of exploitation are not incompatible, and that luck egalitarianism can explain why Marxian exploitation is unjust.
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Notes
Rawls has an influential discussion of this idea in A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1999, p. 64).
Cohen (2011). See below, p. 25.
Vrousalis (2014).
Marx (1976, p. 874).
Along these lines, noted global justice theorist Thomas Pogge (2008, p. 209) has argued that ‘... social-starting positions of the worst-off and the better-off have emerged from a single historical process that was pervaded by massive, grievous wrongs’, and that the current ‘radical inequality’ that characterizes global distributions is, therefore, unjust.
Marx (1976, p. 274). Marx (1976, p. 723) also writes: ‘Capitalist production therefore reproduces in the course of its own process the separation between labor power and the conditions of labor. It thereby reproduces and perpetuates the conditions under which the worker is exploited. It incessantly forces him to sell his labor power in order to live, and enables the capitalist to purchase labor power in order that he may enrich himself.’ The separation of labor power from the conditions of labor is both a pre-requisite of capitalism and reproduced within it.
Marx (1976, p. 728).
Elster (1985, p. 224). Elster also cites the passage as providing strong evidence that Marx viewed capitalism, and in particular the appropriation of surplus-value, as unjust.
Elster (198, pp. 224–226).
In addition to the normative challenge it might be argued that the clean path argument has the potential to explain developments in formerly socialist societies and what was missing in Soviet-style, centrally planned socialisms. For these latter arguments, see Roemer (1983, pp. 370, 385–386) and Nove (1983, pp. 109–111) respectively.
The Chamberlain parable has generated much critical discussion. My understanding of it has been shaped in particular by Cohen’s (1995, pp. 19–66; 2011, pp. 125–131) extensive and insightful critical discussion. Other helpful critical discussions can be found in van der Veen and Van Parijs (1985), Fried (1995), and Vallentyne (2011).
Nozick (1974, p. 161).
Nozick (1974, pp. 162–163).
See Table 1, which in addition to these three arguments in Nozick adds the clean path argument found in Marx that was discussed in section II and also advanced by Kymlicka and Vrousalis respectively and which will be discussed in section IV.
Support for the labor contribution principle can be found in Marx (1978), where there is recognition of justified inequality in the lower stage of communism.
It is worth noting that in each of Nozick’s cases the exertion of labor effort and/or productive contribution seem to have some role in determining the distributive outcome: Chamberlain develops and uses his talent, the socialist citizen works overtime, and the socialist entrepreneur innovatively designs a machine and gives philosophy lectures. I would hazard that our reactions to Nozick’s examples are governed (at least partly) by intuitions related to the significance of productive contribution, rather than the significance of market exchange.
Schweickart (2011, pp. 77–79).
I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this question.
Kymlicka (2002, pp. 185–186), Vrousalis (2013, pp. 148–150; 2014, pp. 156–158). Kymlicka’s version of the argument, which draws extensively on Dworkin’s (2000), equality of resources pre-dates the use of the term ‘luck egalitarianism'. But his use of the choice/circumstances distinction places his argument in the camp of what has come to be called luck egalitarianism.
Kymlicka (2002, p. 185).
A complicating factor here concerns the problem of expensive/inexpensive taste. It might be the case that the gardener enjoys gardening just as much as the tennis player enjoys playing tennis—and it is his good luck that the activity he enjoys is also productive in a way that tennis playing is not. I think the thing to say here from a Marxian standpoint is that this would be an instance of socialist exploitation or injustice, rather capitalist exploitation since the cause of the inequality are preferences for which the agents in question are, ex hypothesi, not responsible; note the cause of inequality is not the unequal ownership of the means of production as in the classical case of capitalist exploitation. I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this difficulty.
Kymlicka (2002, p. 185).
Kymlicka (2002, pp. 185, 205, footnote 17).
Kymlicka (2002, p. 186).
Kymlicka (2002, p. 185, 205, footnote 17).
Cohen (2011).
The earlier mentioned possibility of a capitalist sector in a socialist society comes to mind here as an example.
Vrousalis (2013, p. 132).
Another example that illustrates the point is from Chris Meyers: ‘Suppose Carole is driving across the desert on a desolate road when her car breaks down... Jason offers her a ride but only on the condition that she allow him to sodomize her first... Carole accepts the offer, allows herself to be sodomized, and then afterward, true to his word, Jason drives her to the nearest town, and she is grateful’ (Meyers 2004, p. 324). Even if Carole is responsible for being in her predicament, the contract is exploitative. I want to thank an anonymous referee for bringing the example to my attention.
Cohen (2011, pp. 27–29).
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Warren, P. Karl Marx and Wilt Chamberlain, or: Luck Egalitarianism, Exploitation, and the Clean Path to Capitalism Argument. Res Publica 23, 453–473 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-016-9337-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-016-9337-y