Abstract
What kind of equality should we value and why? Current debate centres around whether distributive equality is valuable. However, it is not the only (potentially) morally significant form of equality. David Miller and T. M. Scanlon have emphasised the importance of social equality—a strongly egalitarian notion distinct from distributive equality, and which cannot be reduced to a concern for overall welfare or the welfare of the worst-off. However, as debate tends to focus on distribution, social equality has been neglected and we do not have a clear understanding of what it is and why it might be valuable. This paper aims to address this gap.
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Notes
See, for example, Jennie Brown’s (1994, p. 26) biography of the civil rights activist, Medgar Evers.
For examples, see Nelson Mandela’s (1995, pp. 145, 413) autobiography.
I discuss social inequalities as separable from violations of justice such as violations in the distributions of material goods and in power and political participation, for example, even though they often occur in conjunction with violations of justice or can lead to these violations of justice. However it is possible to see violations of social inequality as injustices in of themselves, beyond merely being morally objectionable. I take no particular stance on whether, as morally objectionable inequalities, social inequalities are also indeed injustices. I thus say (other) violations of justice to take account of the view that social inequalities could indeed, but need not be, violations of justice.
There could be practical reasons why some people (one group) should get out of other people’s way (another group)—for example, it might be expected that if you are able-bodied or unencumbered, you should be expected to get out of the way of someone who has difficulty walking or is carrying heavy burdens. These would not be examples of social inequality—if anything they could be seen as means for trying to achieve equality through compensation.
As social inequalities tend to occur along with other kinds of injustices, the distinction I draw between social equality and overlapping but distinct notions such as distributive equality is primarily analytical.
See, for example, Rawls on primary goods as an example of the resourcist approach (1999, Sect. 11, pp. 54–55; Sect. 15, pp. 78–81. I will refer throughout this paper to this edition of A Theory of Justice, revised from the original of 1971) and Dworkin (1981a, b) for a defence of resourcism and criticism of welfarism. See also Sen (1982), Nussbaum (2000) and Anderson (2010) on capabilities, and Arneson (1989, 2006) for his defence of equal opportunity for welfare as the currency of justice, and criticism of the capabilities approach.
See, for example, Lucas (1965), Frankfurt (1987) and Crisp (2003) on sufficiency, and Parfit (1997) on the priority view as an alternative to valuing equality of welfare per se. For a defence of equality as valuable per se, see Temkin (1993, 2003). For a recent clarification and criticism of sufficiency, and its relationship to equality and priority, see Casal (2007), and for a clarification and defence of egalitariainism, see O’Neill (2008).
This is not to say that distributive equality might not also be a significant notion. What I question is that it should be the only significant notion of equality. Often descriptions of a particular type of equality are associated with the claim that it is the only type of morally significant equality. This is not my claim about social equality. Furthermore, although it is possible to see social equality as a foundational notion and to use it as a basis to defend other forms of equality, I do not believe that social equality needs to be seen in this way. One could feasibly claim that it is simply one of a number of significant aspects of what we mean when we describe a society of equals.
The term ‘social’ equality is ambiguous. For example, it could be used as a much broader term to indicate any socially-caused inequality. However, my use of the term, following on from Runciman (1967) and Miller (1998), separates social equality (or what can also be called status equality) from related, overlapping notions such as equality of power. It is for this reason, for example, that I do not discuss exploitation or domination, which are usually linked to economic and political power. As emphasised in the introduction, this is primarily an analytical distinction, and thus social inequalities are seldom found to be separate from other forms of inequalities in practice. It is necessary to draw such a distinction, however, precisely for the purposes of this paper, which is to determine what social equality is as a distinct, genuinely egalitarian ideal which cannot be reduced to other concerns, for example, about power and wealth. However, although I claim social inequalities cannot be reduced to other forms of inequality, power hierarchies will, of course, often also imply status inequality. What kind of a relationship there is between inequality of power and inequality of status requires greater exploration as a topic on its own.
For ease of description, I will refer here to a person in comparison to another person. Mainly, however, social inequalities occur between groups of people. Although it is possible to have (somewhat) personal status hierarchies, the hierarchies to which I am referring are those usually constructed by a social group or community or society, rather than an individual or isolated groups of individuals. Something similar can be said about those who are on the lower rungs of the hierarchy: although in practice it may be only one particular individual who is marginalised, perhaps they are the only black person in a small community, they are often marginalised because they belong to a particular social group or because they do not belong to a particular social group, or, most likely, a combination of both. However, I do not think that social equality is intrinsically group-related. An individual can still be treated as inferior even if this is not associated with any particular group membership.
Or vice versa—one person could be deemed superior in relation to another person, who is either directly deemed to be an inferior or who, by virtue of their relationship to a superior person, automatically becomes the inferior.
I refer to Walzer (1983, p. xiii): ‘This is the lively hope named by the word equality: no more bowing and scraping, fawning and toadying; no more fearful trembling; no more high-and-mightiness.’ The overall example owes a debt to Walzer as well—he refers to a society of equals as a ‘society of misters’ (p. 256)—although note that in contrast, I will claim that we need to distinguish between titles, per se, and unequal relationships, which holds out the possibility that titles with a functional purpose are compatible with an equal society.
Although, of course, this might raise the question of why a differentiating title would be necessary if it did not indicate esteem, but this is different from the claim that giving someone a title is necessarily indicative of a particular status.
Runciman (1967) highlights that social inequality can be identified by looking for culturally specific behaviours which treat individuals differently in terms of how much respect they are afforded, in contrast to behaviours which treat them differently in terms of praise. For example, respect might be indicated by bowing, while praise may be indicated by clapping, although these indicators will differ from society to society. Social inequality ensues then when we demand that some individuals bow in the presence of others, but it does not ensue when some individuals clap in the presence of others. I do not think, however, that Runciman’s description is sufficient for distinguishing between behaviour that violates social equality and that which is consistent with it. Runciman’s distinction would allow too much questionable behaviour. For example, he implies that a ‘white skin appreciation’ society, which purports to admire white skin in the same way as athletic ability is often admired, could be understood simply as a form of praise (Runciman 1967, p. 222). However, in a non-ideal world marked by a history of the oppression of, and continued discrimination against, non-white races, this, even if it is only a form of praise when considering the type of behaviour alone, seems far too close to an understanding of white superiority that it does not seem consistent with social equality.
Consider, as a similar example, Jonathan Wolff’s discussion of how opportunity conceptions of justice humiliate welfare claimants by requiring ‘shameful revelation’ (Wolff 1998, p. 114).
For more on separate spheres, see Walzer (1983) and Miller (1995). Scanlon claims that although Walzer’s notion of complex equality is open to much criticism as a theory of distributive justice, it could be seen as feasible if limited merely to an approach for reducing the conflict between feelings of inferiority and inevitable inequalities which arise from the values associated with skills and accomplishment. See Scanlon (2000, p. 56).
Fraser (1997) and Young (1990) have also criticised theories of distributive justice in ways that have relevance for a notion of social equality. By focusing on cultural injustices and distinguishing these from distributive justice, Fraser’s theory of recognition shares some important similarities with social equality. There is also some overlap between a notion of social equality and Iris Marion Young’s politics of difference. Young criticises justice defined in distributive terms claiming that injustice should rather be understood in terms of domination and oppression, However, despite these overlaps, social equality is distinct from Fraser and Young’s notions—social equality condemns a very specific type of the relationship, that represented by status hierarchies, and centres itself explicitly as a form of egalitarianism. It is both more specific and more strongly egalitarian than Fraser and Young’s theories. Furthermore, unlike Young’s understanding of justice, a notion of social equality does not (necessarily) imply that we should emphasise procedural justice and democratic decision-making over distributive patterns.
This is primarily a problem for the notion of intrinsic value, rather than for social equality specifically. However, there could be phenomena about which almost everyone shares the intuition that they are valuable in of themselves (pleasure is probably an example here), and these kind of phenomena may (1) indicate that the notion of intrinsic value is indeed meaningful and (2) call into question whether other notions, about which this intuition is not so widely shared, are then valuable in of themselves.
However, Williams (1972) provides an excellent analysis of how common humanity and equal respect as the foundations of a notion of equality, although admittedly ‘vague and inconclusive’ (p. 118), are not at all as trivial or lacking in substance as inegalitarians often claim.
It is difficult to distinguish harms that could result from social inequality in isolation from overlapping or resulting inequalities or violations of justice. One could argue that the harms that ensue are due to the injustices rather than social inequalities per se, e.g. through overt discrimination or a lack of access to primary social goods. What is particularly interesting about the research on the social determinants of health, however, is that status in of itself seems to be linked to ill health, rather than (merely) material well-being and access to health care.
Contemporary notions of equality seem to neglect this aspect of inequality but earlier understandings at least tend to make reference to the harm of being treated as superior as well as that of being treated as inferior. Consider for example, Matthew Arnold, quoted by Tawney (1938, p. 1), ‘On the one side… inequality harms by pampering’.
Perhaps one might be tempted to claim that this sees causation the wrong way around—it is cruel and inhumane people who develop these oppressive systems. Of course, it must be acknowledged that the main architects of morally reprehensible social systems along with many of their supporters are indeed cruel and inhumane, but it would be ridiculous to suggest that the social system itself did not have a profound influence on the people who lived within it.
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Acknowledgments
This paper is based on a chapter of my PhD thesis although it has undergone substantial changes since my PhD was completed at University College London in 2007. I am very grateful to Jonathan Wolff, my PhD supervisor, for many helpful comments on my thesis and early versions of this paper. I am also grateful to Faith Armitage, Andrew Mason and Anne Phillips for providing useful feedback. More recent revisions have been undertaken with numerous helpful comments and suggestions from anonymous reviewers. As a part of my thesis, this paper was started with the financial support of a Commonwealth Scholarship, and revisions were undertaken with support from the Swiss National Science Foundation.
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Fourie, C. What is Social Equality? An Analysis of Status Equality as a Strongly Egalitarian Ideal. Res Publica 18, 107–126 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-011-9162-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-011-9162-2