Abstract
Thomas Pogge has argued that we have strong negative duties to assist the global poor because we harm them through our contribution to the global economic order. I argue that Pogge’s concept of harm is indeterminate. The resources of any group will typically be affected by at least two economic schemes. Pogge suggests that the responsibility for any affected group’s shortfall from a minimum standard ought to be shared between the contributing schemes. I argue that shared responsibility can be interpreted in two different ways. Unfortunately, both interpretations are problematic. Lastly, I suggest a strategy for amending this problem.
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Notes
This principle, persuasive as it may be, is in fact quite demanding. Singer therefore proposes a weaker version of the second premise. The weaker version omits the phrase ‘comparatively’, so that it only demands that we assist the poor insofar as we do not thereby sacrifice anything of moral importance.
Some might find this claim controversial. I nevertheless take it for granted in the present context.
I am grateful to Bjørn-Erik Rasch for instructive comments on this point.
Two qualifications: First, sometimes intermediate duties require simultaneous compensation. We contribute to the institutional orders that would have been unjust had we not simultaneously compensated through international tax regimes or by donating to NGOs. Second, sometimes intermediate duties can arise from inflicted harm that does not actually constitute a violation of a negative duty. If I break into your cabin during a blizzard, and then compensate you later, I have not violated your rights, because I have acted permissibly. I thank Thomas Pogge for these clarifications.
The claim that our intermediate duties are especially strong towards those we actually harm (as opposed to other needy individuals), has recently been challenged. See Øverland (2005).
As mentioned above, Pogge does not deny that we may also have positive duties towards those poor people who we are not engaged in harming. He tends, however to be somewhat ambiguous on this count, probably because it is important to him to base his theory on the less controversial negative duties. See for instance Pogge (2002, pp. 130–131).
I do this in order to simplify and focus my presentation. I do not want to imply that compensation is necessarily a less proper response to one’s breaches of negative duties.
Pogge refers to this in relation to a more demanding baseline (Pogge 2002, p. 136).
In some cases such a group would be a small elite; in other cases it could be a large majority.
Homegrown causes could of course include other factors than those belonging naturally to a national economic order.
When I say that GE and NE determine A’s w, I do not mean to imply that members of A are passive bystanders to whom benefits are either extended or not. The members of A are assumed to be normally hard-working and resourceful persons. It is nevertheless a fact that the workings of the economic schemes that apply to them have effects on the results of their efforts. I assume, then, that the members of A do their part, so to speak, but that the economic schemes that apply to them determine the extent to which they are able to reap the fruits of their labor.
Assume for instance that a more equitable distribution within the state to which A belongs would allow A to reach b, even in the absence of any reform of GE, and without thereby pushing any other group below b.
This is the type of responsibility that intuitively seems to fit best with the notion of negative duties. It is also the type that seems to fit best with the general thrust of Pogge’s argument. See for instance Pogge (2002, p. 33).
This way of distributing responsibility would be evident in cases where two parents share the responsibility of supporting their child with the emotional and material security necessary for her to lead a fulfilling life. If one parent for some reason is unable to fulfill her responsibilities, this does not reduce the other parent’s responsibilities by half.
One might here be tempted to contemplate the idea that A is entitled to a decent share of all the surplus of all the schemes that are imposed upon it. Although it might be possible to defend this conception, it does not fit into the Lockean baseline framework, since the baseline would then increase with the number of schemes affecting A.
This statement, of course, is true only with regards to the minimal Lockean baseline. Pogge, as well as most others, would claim that justice demands (much) more.
The following scenarios admittedly invoke hypothetical judgements that are not easily evaluated. It seems, however, that unless it makes sense to ask how an economic scheme to which we contribute would have affected A in the absence of other influencing factors, it is very hard to assess the extent to which we are in breach of negative duties when contributing to it. To simplify, assume that you impose upon me a scheme of economic exchange that is mutually beneficial, and that a third person also imposes upon me scheme that is disastrous to my economic situation. In that case, it is hard to see how you harm me. This is not meant as an analogue to the situation between the actual global economic scheme and the world’s poor. It is only to motivate the hypothetical disaggregation of contributing factors.
I grateful to Thomas Pogge for these objections.
This number will of course vary with the number of Es as well as with the relative determining power that the various Es hold over A’s w.
That said, I claim no originality in explicating this idea. I think, however, that this view merits further specification.
For a fuller account of the principle of telic sufficiency, see my ‘Defending the Principle of Sufficiency’, work in progress.
At least to the extent that we feel morally disturbed by world poverty, as I believe relatively many do.
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Huseby, R. Duties and Responsibilities Towards the Poor. Res Publica 14, 1–18 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-008-9047-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-008-9047-1