Abstract
Nowadays, neo-institutionalistic approaches are prominent in economics, political science, the science of public administration and sociology. There is a general complaint about the vagueness of the concept of institutions and the apparent disparity of phenomena falling under it. This article shows how institutional legal theory provides a typology of institutions as sets of rules and corresponding patterns of regulated behaviour that can help to avert much confusion. The typology’s usefulness is tested by applying it to an array of private governance structures distinguished by transaction cost economics.
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The author would like to thank two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this article.
See for an extensive account of these two developments K. van Kersbergen and F. van Waarden, Shifts in Governance: Problems of Legitimacy and Accountability. Paper on the theme ‘Shifts in Governance’ as part of the Strategic Plan 2002--2005 of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) (The Hague: NWO, 2001).
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Ruiter, D.W.P. Types of Institutions as Patterns of Regulated Behaviour. Res Publica 10, 207–231 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-004-0541-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-004-0541-9