Skip to main content
Log in

Underwriter warrants, underwriter reputation, and growth signaling

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We present an alternative explanation of warrant use for underwriter compensation. We consider underwriter warrants as a signaling device to convey an issuing firm’s future growth potential and test this signaling role of warrant use by taking a direct approach in a seasoned equity offering (SEO) environment. Employing a matched-sample approach, we find that the use of warrants mitigates the negative price effects of SEOs. Specifically, the issuance of SEOs with warrant-based compensation has a significantly less negative impact on abnormal return performance than the issuance of SEOs with cash-based compensation. The results of logit regressions confirm this linkage. We further find that this less negative impact on firm value is attributable to the signaling value representing the issuing firm’s future growth prospects through warrant compensation even in the presence of underwriter reputation variables. These results suggest that firms with greater growth prospects benefit more by issuing SEOs with warrant compensation than with cash compensation. Overall, our results support the growth signaling effect of warrant compensation as an additional role of underwriter warrants in the SEO market.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See, for example, Smith (1977), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Booth and Smith (1986), Barry et al. (1991), Dunbar (1995), and Ng and Smith (1996).

  2. Previous literature on underwriter certification suggests that underwriters help reduce information asymmetry through certification in the US (Booth and Smith 1986; Beatty and Ritter 1986; Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1994; Ng and Smith 1996; Puri 1996; Dunbar 2000; McLaughlin et al. 2000), the UK (Slovin et al. 2000), and Japan (Cooney et al. 2003). For instance, Booth and Smith (1986) argue that if the net benefit from revealing the true issuing-firm value of an SEO, after accounting for the cost of hiring a high-quality underwriter, exceeds the benefit of hiding the true issuing-firm value, then the firm will hire high-quality underwriters.

  3. Dunbar (1995) and Ng and Smith (1996) address the selection bias problem using Heckman adjustments in their regression models where the findings are crucially dependent on the assumptions underlying the econometric models.

  4. We do not match firms by industry primarily because our sample SEOs are often clustered in one industry. Loughran and Ritter (1995) note two reasons of industry-wide misvaluations and availability of matching firms for not matching by industry.

  5. We also used the standard deviation of stock returns for 60 days preceding the announcement date as an alternative measure of offering risk. The mean of this variable was 0.292 for CBC offerings and 0.415 for WBC offerings, with the difference being significant at the 0.01 level (t-statistic = 6.70). The regression results using this variable were qualitatively similar to those using SIGMA.

  6. The underpricing of SEOs has recently drawn much attention among financial economists. Several studies (e.g., Altinkiliç and Hansen 2003; Corwin 2003; Mola and Loughran 2004) report that the underpricing of SEOs has become commonplace and that the magnitude of SEO underpricing has increased more dramatically in the 1990s than it did during earlier periods. Corwin (2003) documents that SEO underpricing increased to 2.92% for offers during the 1990–1998 period from 1.15% for offers in the 1980s and that the average reached a high of 3.72% in 1996.

References

  • Altinkiliç O., & Hansen, R. S. (2003). Discounting and underpricing in seasoned equity offers. Journal of Financial Economics, 69, 285–323.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barber, B. M., & Lyon, J. D. (1996). Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specifications of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics, 41, 359–399.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barry, C. B., Muscarella, C. J., & Vetsuypens, M. R. (1991). Underwriter warrants, underwriter compensation, and the costs of going public. Journal of Financial Economics, 29, 113–135.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beatty, R. P., & Ritter, J. R. (1986). Investment banking, reputation and the underpricing of initial public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 15, 213–232.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Booth, J. R., & Smith, R. L. (1986). Capital raising, underwriting and the certification hypothesis. Journal of Financial Economics, 15, 261–281.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bradley, M., Jarrell, G. A., & Kim, E. H. (1984). On the existence of an optimal capital structure: Theory and evidence. Journal of Finance, 39, 857–878.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Byoun, S. (2004). Stock performance following seasoned stock-warrant unit offering. Journal of Business, 77, 75–100.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carter, R. B., & Manaster, S. (1990). Initial public offerings and underwriter reputation. Journal of Finance, 45, 1045–1067.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carter, R. B., Dark, F. H., Singh, A. K. (1998). Underwriter reputation, initial returns, and the long-run performance of IPO stocks. Journal of Finance, 53, 285–311.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chan, K., Cooney, J. W., Kim, J., Singh, A. K. (2005). The IPO derby–are there consistent losers and winners on this track?. Working paper, National Taiwan University.

  • Chemmanur, T. J., & Fulghieri, P. (1994). Investment bank reputation, information production and financial intermediation. Journal of Finance, 49, 47–79.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cooney, J. W., Kato, H. K., & Schallheim, J. S. (2003). Underwriter certification and Japanese seasoned equity issues. Review of Financial Studies 16:949–982.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Corwin, S. A. (2003). The determinants of underpricing of seasoned equity offers. Journal of Finance, 58, 2249–2279.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dunbar, C. (2000). Factors affecting investment bank initial public offering market share. Journal of Financial Economics, 55, 3–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dunbar, G. (1995). The use of warrants as underwriter compensation in initial public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 59–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 105–155.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jo, H., & Kim, Y. (2007). Disclosure frequency and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 84, 561–590.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jo, H., Kim, Y., & Park, M. (2007). Underwriter choice and earnings management. Review of Accounting Studies, 12, 23–59.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jung, K., Kim, Y., & Stulz, R. (1996). Investment opportunities, managerial discretion and the security issue decision. Journal of Financial Economics, 42, 159–185.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Karim, Rutledge, K. R., Gara, S., & Ahmed, M. (2001). An empirical examination of the pricing of seasoned equity offerings: A test of the signaling hypothesis. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 17, 63–79.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lang, L. H. P., Stulz, R. M., & Walkling, R. A. (1991). A test of the free cash flow hypothesis: The case of bidder returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 29, 315–335.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loughran, T., & Ritter, J. R. (1995). The new issues puzzle. Journal of Finance, 50, 23–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loughran, T., & Ritter, J. R. (1997). The operating performance of firms conducting seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Finance, 52, 1823–1850.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Luo, G., Brick, I., & Frierman, M. (2002). Strategic decision making of the firm under asymmetric information. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 19, 215–237.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McLaughlin, R., Safieddine, A., & Vasudevan, G. (2000). Investment banker reputation and the performance of seasoned equity issuers. Financial Management, 29, 96–110.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mikkelson, W. H., & Partch, M. M. (1986). Valuation effects of security offerings and the issuance process. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 31–60.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mola, S., & Loughran, T. (2004). Discounting and clustering in seasoned equity offer prices. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39, 1–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ng, C. K., & Smith, R. L. (1996). Determinants of contract choice: The use of warrants to compensate underwriters of seasoned equity issues. Journal of Finance, 51, 363–380.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Opler, T., & Titman, S. (1993). The determinants of leveraged buyout activity: Free cash flow vs. financial distress costs. Journal of Finance, 48, 1985–1999.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oxelheim, L., & Randoy, T. (2003). The impact of foreign board membership on firm value. Journal of Banking and Finance, 27, 2369–2392.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Puri, M. (1996). Commercial banks in investment banking: Conflict of interest or certification role? Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 373–401.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Slovin, M. B., Sushka, M. E., & Hudson, C. D. (1990). External monitoring and its effect on seasoned common stock issues. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12, 397–417.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Slovin, M. B., Sushka, M. E., & Lai, K. W. L. (2000). Alternative flotation methods, adverse selection, and ownership structure: Evidence from seasoned equity issuance in the U.K. Journal of Financial Economics, 57, 309–327.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, C. W. Jr. (1977). Alternative methods for raising capital: Rights versus underwritten offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 273–307.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, C. W. Jr. (1986). Investment banking and the capital raising process. Journal of Financial Economics, 15, 3–29.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, J. K., & Smith, R. (2000). Entrepreneurial finance. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

  • Spiess, D. K., & Affleck-Graves, J. (1995). Underperformance in long-run stock returns following seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 243–267.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the editor, Cheng-Few Lee and two anonymous referees for valuable suggestions, as well as to Allen N. Berger, Jaisik Gong, Beom-Sik Jang, Yongtae Kim, Chee K. Ng, Eli Ofek, Stephen E. Skomp, and Greg F. Udell for their helpful comments on the earlier version of the article. Bae gratefully acknowledges research support from the CBA Summer Research Grant Program at Bowling Green State University, and Jo appreciates financial support from the Dean Witter Fund and the Breetwor Fellowship.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hoje Jo.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bae, S.C., Jo, H. Underwriter warrants, underwriter reputation, and growth signaling. Rev Quant Finan Acc 29, 129–154 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-007-0030-2

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-007-0030-2

Keywords

JEL Classifications

Navigation