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Alvin Plantinga on the ontological argument

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Abstract

By taking ‘existence in reality’ to be a great-making property and ‘God’ to be the greatest possible being, Plantinga skillfully presents Anselm’s ontological argument. However, since he proves God’s existence by virtue of a premise, “God (a maximally great being) is a possible being”, that is true only if God actually exists; his argument begs the question of the existence of God.

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References

  • Plantinga A. (1974a) God, freedom and evil. Harper and Row Publishers, Inc, New York

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  • Plantinga A. (1974b) The nature of necessity. Oxford University Press, Oxford

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, 342 Overlook Drive, West Lafayette, IN, 47906, USA

    William L. Rowe

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  1. William L. Rowe
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Correspondence to William L. Rowe.

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Rowe, W.L. Alvin Plantinga on the ontological argument. Int J Philos Relig 65, 87–92 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-008-9182-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-008-9182-9

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