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“On a Level with Dentists?” Reflections on the Evolution of Industrial Organization

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Abstract

This essay provides a brief overview of the evolution of the field of industrial organization from its emergence to the present, and it offers some observations about the present state of the field. While there has been considerable progress in industrial organization over time, its uphill path has not been straight.

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  1. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Room E62-525, Cambridge, MA, 02142, USA

    Richard Schmalensee

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Correspondence to Richard Schmalensee.

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This paper is based on my keynote address at the International Industrial Organization Conference, March 17, 2012. I am indebted to Christopher Knittel, Jonathan Levin, Ariel Pakes, Nancy Rose, Stephen Ryan, and the editor, Lawrence White for extremely valuable comments and conversations, but I of course retain responsibility for all errors and opinions.

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Schmalensee, R. “On a Level with Dentists?” Reflections on the Evolution of Industrial Organization. Rev Ind Organ 41, 157–179 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-012-9356-6

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