Abstract
We construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical predictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory policy, institutional features, economic shocks and of several characteristics of the concession contracts themselves.
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Guasch, J.L., Laffont, JJ. & Straub, S. Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: A Theoretical Approach. Rev Ind Organ 29, 55–73 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-006-9109-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-006-9109-5