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Decision-making by children

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Abstract

In this paper, we examine the determinants of decision-making power by children and young adolescents. Moving beyond previous economic models that treat children as goods consumed by adults, we develop a noncooperative model of parental control of child behavior and child resistance. Using child reports of decision-making and psychological and cognitive measures from the NLSY79 Child Supplement, we examine the determinants of shared and sole decision-making based on indices created from seven domains of child activity. We find that the determinants of sole decision-making by the child and shared decision-making with parents are quite distinct: sharing decisions appears to be a form of parental investment in child development rather than a simple stage in the transfer of authority. In addition, we find that indicators of child capabilities and preferences affect reports of decision-making authority in ways that suggest child demand for autonomy as well as parental discretion in determining these outcomes.

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Notes

  1. Critics of the altruist model also raise the possibility of strategic behavior by children that can limit parental control and cause the rotten kid theorem to fail (Bergstrom 1989; Bruce and Waldman 1990), but these criticisms apply to marital bargaining as well.

  2. Pollak (1988) argues that there is likely to be a divergence between what children want and what parents want for their children, and calls preferences of the sort we assume “paternalistic preferences.” Our theory does not require that parents’ preferences are more—or less—likely to be developmentally appropriate than children’s preferences. In some cases, parents’ expectations may be in fact harmful to children’s development, as in the case of children with excess household responsibilities or children held to unattainable academic or athletic standards.

  3. We think of Y K as a function of parent’s resources as well as the family environment, but making this dependence explicit has no effect on the results that follow. In Becker’s altruist model, manipulation of the child’s resources through transfers provides an alternative representation of parenting.

  4. If the child resistance function is positively sloped, and steeper than the parental control function, then the equilibrium is unstable, and may result in ever-increasing levels of c and r.

  5. A possible extension of this model would allow parental control to be produced with inputs of parental time and money. In this case, the effect of Y on control would be ambiguous, since higher-resource parents would also have a higher price of time.

  6. Unless the price of parental time is an important component of the cost of control.

  7. An additional statement “I often get in a jam because I do things without thinking” was excluded because Cronbach’s alpha indicated its correlation with other items in the index is not high.

  8. The CSAS is a self-report booklet filled out by children over age 10 (10–14 beginning in 1994) that collects information on a wide variety of topics, including parent–child interactions, attitudes towards school, peer interactions, and substance abuse. The content was expanded between 1988 and 1994, but remained reasonably constant between 1994 and 2000.

  9. Very few children listed friends and others as participants in these decisions (less than 2%). We include reports that friends make the decision as the child’s own decision, and include stepfather and “someone else” with parents. In the 2002 wave of this survey, the options for reported decision-makers become much more detailed. Children are able to report grandparents, stepmothers, and other adult relatives as possible decision-makers, and we find that these groups make up the majority of the “someone else” category.

  10. One might ask whether reported decision-making is actually related to behavior. Other evidence from the survey suggests that it is. In the NLSY-C survey, children are asked, “Within the last month, have you and your parent(s) gone to church or religious services together?” and “How much time do you spend watching television on typical weekday/Saturday/Sunday?” We regress the answers to these two questions on the corresponding decision dummies (own, shared and parent). We find that children who make their own decisions about television watch more television, and watch less when their parents make or share the decision. Likewise, the children are less likely to have gone to church last month when they make their own decision on religion, and more likely when their parents make or share the decision.

  11. An alternative interpretation of y would allow reported child decision-making to be a function of both c and r. If the number of child-controlled decision domains, for example, depends on c – r, all of the comparative statics results in Sect. 3 follow, except for the effect of Y K, which will be ambiguous.

  12. Separate analyses for boys and girls shows that the height effect is particularly strong for girls.

  13. In related work (Romich et al. 2008), we examine decision-making by a sample of 12 and 13 year olds in the NLSY-C in the context of developmental psychology and include child helpful and problem behaviors as regressors. We show that a mother-reported behavioral problems index is not significantly related to decision autonomy, but that children who regularly do chores have less autonomy while children who spend time with siblings report more shared decision-making.

  14. The results for shared decisions are not reported to simplify the presentation.

  15. We speculate that this general restrictiveness may reflect minority parents’ concerns about spending choices that could lead to financial difficulties or clothing choices that might attract unwanted attention from authorities or predatory older adults.

  16. We thank the editor for suggesting this interpretation.

  17. An alternative measure of physical maturity for girls, time since menarche, has no significant effect on child decisions.

  18. An interpretation of these results as simply a reporting effect is made less plausible by the sensitivity of the impulsivity coefficient to mother’s education, as reported below.

  19. These results are robust in alternative specifications, such as a fixed-effect count model, and in many cases are stronger. For example, the positive effect of impulsivity on shared decisions in the high-education sample is strongly significant in a fixed-effect Poisson model.

  20. It may also reflect the reduced parental control that children who score high on this instrument receive.

  21. The reference table can be found at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhanes/growthcharts/statage.txt.

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Acknowledgements

We gratefully acknowledge comments from participants in the AEA session “Bargaining in Families” at the 2005 ASSA meetings in Philadelphia, PA and from seminar participants at Cornell University, UCLA, University of Washington, Washington University in St. Louis, the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Essex, the University of Warwick, and the editor and referees of this journal. Financial support was provided by NICHD (R01 HD45635-2—“Child agency in resource allocation,” Romich, Principal Investigator) and by Lundberg’s Castor Professorship. Thanks to Xiang Gao, Lisa Keating, and Cori Mar for invaluable assistance.

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Correspondence to Shelly Lundberg.

Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Height

The reference table from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Health and Human ServicesFootnote 21 is used. It was released in 2000, based on children in the United States. A group is defined for each age-in-month and each gender (so there are 59 × 2 = 118 groups). For each group, three parameters (the median (M), the generalized coefficient of variation (S), and the power in the Box-Cox transformation (L)) are obtained from the table. With these parameters the z-score is calculated, as suggested by the Centers, for each child of height X as: \( Z = \frac{{\left( {X/M} \right)^{L} - 1}}{L*S},\;L \ne 0 \). We drop 46 observations with a z-score of absolute value more than 5.

1.2 Fixed-effects ordered logit model

Our three dependent variables (own, shared, and parent decisions) are all discrete dependent variables y ij that can take K possible values 0, 1,…, − 1. Since the number of decisions made is an ordinal measure of autonomy, we use the ordered logit model for estimation. Computational problems arise when we incorporate fixed effects in the model. This appendix describes a simple two-step procedure of estimating the fixed-effects ordered logit model first proposed by Das and van Soest (1999). See also Ejrnaes and Portner (2004) and Greene (2008).

We have a discrete dependent variable y ij that can take K + 1 possible values. We do not assume cardinality (i.e., the difference between y ij  = 1 and y ij  = 2 is different from the difference between y ij  = 2 and y ij  = 3).

Consider the following model for a latent variable \( y_{ij}^{*} \) for child j in family i, i = 1,…, I and j = 1,…, J:

$$ y_{ij}^{*} = \alpha_{i} + {\mathbf{x}}_{ij}^{\prime } {\varvec{\beta}} + \varepsilon_{ij} ,\;\varepsilon_{ij} \;{\text{has}}\;{\text{a}}\;{\text{logistic}}\;{\text{distribution}}\;{\text{conditional}}\;{\text{on}}\;{\mathbf{X}}_{i} \;{\text{and}}\;\alpha_{i} $$

The observed choice y ij depends on the latent variable

$$ \begin{aligned} y_{ij} = 0&\quad{\text{ if }}y_{ij}^{*} \le 0 \hfill \\ y_{ij} = 1 &\quad{\text{ if }}0 < y_{ij}^{*} \le \mu_{1} \hfill \\ \ldots \hfill \\ y_{ij} = K & \quad{\text{ if }}\mu_{K - 1} < y_{ij}^{*} \hfill \\ \end{aligned} $$

Now derive the probability of observing a choice of y ij  = k:

$$ \begin{aligned} \Pr \left( {y_{ij} = k|{\mathbf{X}}_{i} ,\alpha_{i} } \right) \hfill \\ = \Pr \left( {y_{ij}^{*} < \mu_{k} } \right) - \Pr \left( {y_{ij}^{*} < \mu_{k - 1} } \right) \hfill \\ = \Pr \left( {\varepsilon_{ij} < \mu_{k} - \alpha_{i} - {\mathbf{x}}_{ij}^{\prime } {\varvec{\beta}}} \right) - \Pr \left( {\varepsilon_{ij} < \mu_{k - 1} - \alpha_{i} - {\mathbf{x}}_{ij}^{\prime } {\varvec{\beta}}} \right) \hfill \\ = \Uplambda \left( {\mu_{k} - \alpha_{i} - {\mathbf{x}}_{ij}^{\prime } {\varvec{\beta}}} \right) - \Uplambda \left( {\mu_{k - 1} - \alpha_{i} - {\mathbf{x}}_{ij}^{\prime } {\varvec{\beta}}} \right) \hfill \\ \end{aligned} $$

where \( \Uplambda ( \cdot ) \) is the logistic CDF. Now we split the estimation problem into many small ones by defining a binary variable:

$$ s_{ij}^{k} = 1\;{\text{if}}\;y_{ij} > k,\quad k = 0, \ldots ,K - 1 $$

From this definition comes the following result:

$$\Pr \left( {s_{ij}^{k} = 1|\alpha_{i} ,{\mathbf{X}}_{i} } \right) = \Uplambda \left( { - \mu_{k} + \alpha_{i} + {\mathbf{x}}_{ij}^{\prime } {\varvec{\beta}}} \right) = \Uplambda \left( {\theta_{i} + {\mathbf{x}}_{ij}^{\prime } {\varvec{\beta}}} \right) $$
(4)

We lump the cutoff point μ k , which is the same for all individuals, into the fixed family effects α i and have a new family fixed effects θ i . Obviously, we can fit Eq. 4 with the Chamberlain-type conditional fixed effects logit model (Chamberlain 1980). In total there are K such models, and from them we obtain K different sets of estimates for β, call it \( {\varvec{\delta}} = \left( {{\varvec{\beta}}^{\left( 0 \right)} ,{\varvec{\beta}}^{\left( 1 \right)} , \ldots ,{\varvec{\beta}}^{{\left( {K - 1} \right)}} } \right) \).

The next step is to combine the K different sets of estimates. We use a minimum distance estimator with the following objection function:

$$ \left( {{\varvec{\delta}} - \iota_{K} \otimes {\varvec{\beta}}^*} \right)^{\prime } {\mathbf{W}}\left( {{\varvec{\delta}} - \iota_{K} \otimes {\varvec{\beta}}^*}\right) $$

where ι K is a K vector of ones.

Our choice of the weighting matrix W makes use of the inverse of the covariance matrices from the K logit models:

$$ {\mathbf{W}} = \left( {\begin{array}{*{20}c} {\text{var} \left( {{\varvec{\beta}}^{\left( 0 \right)} } \right)} & \cdots & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & {\text{var} \left( {{\varvec{\beta}}^{\left( 1 \right)} } \right)} & {} & {} \\ \vdots & {} & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & {} & \cdots & {\text{var} \left( {{\varvec{\beta}}^{{\left( {K - 1} \right)}} } \right)} \\ \end{array} } \right)^{ - 1}$$

Intuitively, we put less weight on regressions that are less precisely estimated. The covariance matrix of the minimum distance estimator β* is given by

$$ \text{var} \left( {{\varvec{\beta}}^{*} } \right) = \left[ {\left( {\iota_{K} \otimes {\text{I}}} \right)^{\prime } {\mathbf{W}}\left( {\iota_{K} \otimes {\text{I}}} \right)} \right]^{ - 1} \left( {\iota_{K} \otimes {\text{I}}} \right)^{\prime } {\mathbf{W}}\left( {\iota_{K} \otimes {\text{I}}} \right)\left[ {\left( {\iota_{K} \otimes {\text{I}}} \right)^{\prime } {\mathbf{W}}\left( {\iota_{K} \otimes {\text{I}}} \right)} \right]^{ - 1} \cdot $$

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Lundberg, S., Romich, J.L. & Tsang, K.P. Decision-making by children. Rev Econ Household 7, 1–30 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-008-9045-2

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