Abstract
This paper examines the role of patent licensing in the age of outsourcing. When firms rely on outsourced inputs, a patent holder’s decision to license has both competitive and supplier pricing effects. By issuing a license, the firm increases competition in the product market. At the same time, the need to make royalty payments “weakens” the firm’s rival, making it more sensitive to supplier pricing. The supplier responds by softening pricing terms, and the firm benefits by siphoning some of these gains via the license fee. Not only can the licensor gain, but all other parties (the licensee, supplier, and consumers) can also benefit. This role of licensing presents additional considerations for regulators shaping patent laws.
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We thank Michael Crew, John Fellingham, Sharon Oster, David Sappington, Doug Schroeder, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Anil Arya acknowledges support from the John J. Gerlach Chair.