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The Effect of Relisting on House Selling Price

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Abstract

When house sellers reach the end of a listing contract without a sale they are faced with several decisions. A seller who wants to continue to market the property can leave it on the market, relist the property immediately, or take it off the market for a period of time before relisting it. Research has shown that properties with longer time-on-market may carry a stigma and sell for less. In an attempt to mitigate the negative perception of a house that other buyers appear to have passed by, a seller can have the agent relist the property so it appears as a new listing. If a seller decides to relist the property, the owner also has to decide how long to wait before relisting. We use a hedonic approach to investigate the choices sellers have when deciding whether to relist their property and the impact those decisions have on the property’s selling price. We find that relisting a property results in a higher selling price and that to maximize price, the seller should relist the property with the same agent within 30 days.

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Notes

  1. We have also estimated our model while leaving out all distressed properties. Removal of the distressed properties does not impact the significance or sign of the coefficients in our model. These results are available upon request.

  2. Details of calculation of the predicted time on the market and Inverse Mills Ratio are presented in the Appendix.

  3. Excluding sales during the first quarter of 2013 when the housing market started to slightly improve has no effect on the results of the analysis.

  4. Recognizing that some properties may have entered the data collection period already in their second listing period, which would lead to underestimation of their total active days on the market, we tested removing all sales in the first two quarters of the data collection period as they would be the most likely to have already been relisted. The results were unchanged.

  5. Benefield and Hardin (2014) use 48 days and Genesove and Mayer (1997) use 4 weeks. Our findings remain unchanged when 30 and 48 days are used instead of 60 days as the criteria for a “new” listing.

  6. To deter the manipulation of time-on-market, the real estate listing services in some states, such as Massachusetts, have changed their policy governing home listings. The revised policies require the time-on-market measure for a house to be an accurate cumulative total that includes previous listings.

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Correspondence to Patrick S. Smith.

Appendix

Appendix

Predicted time on the market (\( \widehat{TOM} \)) is estimated using the following equation:

$$ TOM=c+\varpi \mathbf{DOP}+\kappa \mathbf{R}+\upsilon \mathbf{A}+\mu $$
(2)

where predicted time-on-market is a function of degree of overpricing, DOP; list price reduction, R; and the atypicality of the house, A. Predicted selling price is used to estimate DOP (see Eq. 3). The results for our intermediate steps are available in Table 5.

Table 5 Intermediate results

The degree of overpricing variable is calculated using the property’s original list price in the first listing contract and predicted selling price. The predicted selling price is obtained using a version of Eq. 1 that is comprised of the physical characteristics of the house, X; distressed conditions surrounding the sale, D; neighborhood characteristics, N; and location and time trend variables representing fixed effects for the exact geographic location and year and season of sale, T.

$$ \mathbf{DOP} = \mathrm{Log}\left(\mathrm{Original}\ \mathrm{List}\ \mathrm{Price}\right)\hbox{--} \mathrm{Log}\left(\mathrm{Predicted}\ \mathrm{Selling}\ \mathrm{Price}\right) $$
(3)

Previous research finds houses with unusual attributes sell for less and take longer to sell (Haurin 1988; Jud et al. 1996). To capture the atypicality effect we use a model similar to the one presented by Turnbull et al. (2006). They measure the extent to which a given house is either larger or smaller than the average living area in the surrounding neighborhood. We index all houses within a one half mile radius of house i by J. The standardized measure of the relative house size is:

$$ Localsiz{e}_i=\frac{Livingare{a}_i-{\displaystyle {\sum}_{j\in J} Livingare{a}_j/{N}_j}}{{\displaystyle {\sum}_{j\in J} Livingare{a}_j/{N}_j}} $$
(4)

where N j is the number of surrounding houses in the neighborhood J. In order to allow for asymmetric relative house size effects on selling price, we define the relative size variables Larger i and Smaller i as the absolute values of the positive and negative values of Localsize i respectively:

$$ Large{r}_i = {\left\{{}_{\left| Localsize\right|}^0\right.}_{, if\kern0.5em Localsiz{e}_i\kern0.5em >\kern0.5em 0}^{, if\kern0.5em Localsiz{e}_i\kern0.5em \le \kern0.5em 0} $$
(5)
$$ Smalle{r}_i = {\left\{{}_{\left| Localsize\right|}^0\right.}_{, if\kern0.5em Localsiz{e}_i\kern0.5em <\kern0.5em 0}^{, if\kern0.5em Localsiz{e}_i\kern0.5em \ge \kern0.5em 0} $$
(6)

List price reduction, R, is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the property’s list price was reduced during the final listing period. If the property’s list price at the beginning of the final listing period equals the list price when the property sold, R takes on the value of 0. Knight (2002) reports that a dummy variable representing whether the list price is changed during the listing period is significantly related to time-on-market.

We also estimate a probit model, where the dependent variable is the probability of a property being relisted, to produce the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) used in Eq. 1. The probit estimation is calculated using the following equation:

$$ \Pr \left(\mathbf{L}\right)=\varOmega \left(\mathbf{T}\mathbf{O}{\mathbf{M}}_{\mathbf{L}}\right)+\theta \left(\mathbf{DOP}\right)+\mu $$
(7)

The independent variables in the probit model are degree of overpricing (DOP) as described above and relisted time-on-market (TOM L ). The time-on-market variable used in the probit model is calculated as the number of days the property was actively listed on the MLS. It represents the sum of all the listing contract periods from the starting date of the original listing contract to the time of sale or to the date it was relisted, whichever comes first. In this way, we avoid Benefield and Hardin’s (2014) criticism of using an MLS calculated time-on-market and correctly count the entire initial listing period plus all subsequent relisting periods. We calculate TOM L as follows:

$$ \mathbf{T}\mathbf{O}{\mathbf{M}}_{\mathbf{L}} = \mathrm{M}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{N}\left(\left[\mathrm{Sale}\ \mathrm{Date}\right],\left[\mathrm{Relist}\ \mathrm{Date}\right]\right)-\left[\mathrm{Initial}\ \mathrm{L}\mathrm{isting}\ \mathrm{Date}\right]-\left[\mathrm{Days}\ \mathrm{not}\ \mathrm{on}\ \mathrm{M}\mathrm{L}\mathrm{S}\right] $$
(8)

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Smith, P.S., Gibler, K.M. & Zahirovic-Herbert, V. The Effect of Relisting on House Selling Price. J Real Estate Finan Econ 52, 176–195 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-015-9503-6

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