Abstract
A prominent philosophical/legal case for requiring 100% bank reserves employs a flawed style of argument. It involves essentialism (criticized by Karl Popper and Joseph Schumpeter), persuasive definitions (identified by Charles L. Stevenson), faulty classification, and the piling up of irrelevant facts and considerations.
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Notes
I single out Professor Huerta de Soto's arguments for their exceptional clarity and detailed documentation. I admire him and his solid work on other Austrian topics and regret recognizing that on the present topic he has misapplied his impressive scholarship and erudition.
Popper (1982, pp. 17–31), O’Hear (1980, pp. 7–8). Dioguardi (n.d.) gives extended quotations from Popper's works. See also Champion (n.d.). Although the essentialism condemned by Popper and the essentialism practiced or admired admired by Carl Menger and some Austrian economists are both partly derived from Aristotle, I doubt that they are quite the same thing (see Smith 1994).
Shahar (2009) is a blatant and instructive example of essentialism. Shahar broods at length over the meanings of words like “justice”, “right” “entitlement”, and “infringement” or “violation” of a right.
Other writings that develop this so-called credit theory of money are Moini (2001), Hummel (n.d.), Innes (1913, 1914), and Macleod (1889, especially pp. 64–85). (Attention to perhaps unusual terminology will forestall misunderstanding.) Macleod also analyzes credit and bank deposits in voluminous other writings, several scanned and to be found at http://books.google.com.
Having a name for such a style of argument would be convenient. “Alan Reynolds style” occurred to me while I was listening to a lecture by that person. I now realize that other authors might lend their names to that style even better.
Unlike actually stamping out fractional reserves, trying to stamp them out, however unsuccessful and pointless, is possible. Its possibility logically neither entails nor excludes that effort's being obligatory (although “ought” presupposes “can”, “can “ does not entail “ought”). Efforts, futile efforts, to stamp out fractional reserves might conceivably, though counterintuitively, be obligatory.
References
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Acknowledgments
I thank David Howden and Philipp Bagus for conversations and correspondence that were stimulating for me even though—or especially because—we disagree on key points. I also thank an anonymous referee for suggestions, particularly about the work of Henry Dunning Macleod.
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Yeager, L.B. Bank reserves: A dispute over words and classification. Rev Austrian Econ 23, 183–191 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-009-0102-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-009-0102-8