Abstract
This paper develops the concept of constitutional culture—the attitude, thoughts, and feelings about constitutional constraints and the nature, scope, and function of constitutionalism. Constitutional culture is approached as a complex emergent phenomenon bridging Hayekian cognitive and institutional insights. It can be studied as a mental model, a series of expectations and understandings about the constitutional order, how it is, and how it ought to be. The “map” and “model” approach from Hayek’s Sensory Order (1952) is employed to understand how individuals and (cautiously) groups of individuals at the national level approach constitutionalism. This paper goes beyond the more traditional one-size-fits-all approach where all individuals respond uniformly to incentives, as provided by the constitution qua contract. Instead, constitutionalism is tied up in the individual’s vision of the world, that is, what Hayek (1948) labels “the facts of the social sciences.” The paper concludes with four areas where constitutional culture can further the insights of constitutional political economy: comparative political economy, constitutional stickiness, constitutional maintenance, and the new development economics.
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Notes
One wonders why constitutional culture receives such scant attention in the literature on constitutional political economy. I suspect there exits a “measurability bias” of sorts in economics (which is, after all, the mother discipline of constitutional political economy): culture does not fit into tidy models or econometric regressions, so it is simpler to assume it away (see Jones 2006; see also Evans 2007, commenting on Boulding 1974; Chamlee-Wright 1997; Tilly 2003; and Lavoie and Chamlee-Wright 2000, 42).
Voigt (1996) explains that “whereas Buchanan is clearly leading the contract notion of the constitution, Hayek [e.g., 1979[1973, 1976, 1979] and 1988) is almost as clearly leading the notion of the constitution as the result of cultural evolution”; see also Hardin (1988) and Gordon (1976).
It should also be noted that the difference between formal and de facto constitutions is covered in the legal literature, if not constitutional political economy and political science. For example, Lasalle (1946[1862] in Santiago 2003) distinguishes between the “real constitution” (actual power structures) and the “juridical constitution” (constitutional parchment).
Generally, see Hayek (1948, 1960, 1967, 1978); Schelling (1978); Resnick (1997); Surowiecki (2005) as well as earlier articulations in Mandeville (1998[1732]); Smith (1997[1759]); Ferguson (1767); Hume (1958[1789]).
See also Rothbard (1997, 15) on the organismic fallacy.
Constitutional culture is an element of political and civic culture (see Almond and Verba 1965; Putnam 1978, 1993, Sartori 1965; Franklin and Baum 1995) dealing specifically with constitutional attitudes; it is thus narrower and does not include related parameters such as civic participation, political cognition, partisanship, pride in institutions, time preference, tolerance, electoral participation, etc. Constitutional culture contains only the elements pertaining to meta-rules, the general organization of law and society, and willingness to be constrained. To be sure, the two (civic/political culture and constitutional culture) are related and intertwined. But I focus here exclusively on constitutional culture, leaving the details of democracy and civic involvement to an already rich literature.
I have argued elsewhere (Wenzel 2009) that Hayek’s cognitive theory forms the very foundation of his institutional theory. My purpose here is different, as I use Hayek’s cognitive theory for its explanatory traction, rather than as an overall foundation for his institutional theory.
Hayek uses a different language to express the same idea when he talks of fixed strategies and variable tactics (Hayek 1967, 56, note 39).
See footnote 10.
See also Butos and Koppl (1993) on the effect of accumulated knowledge on classification.
To clarify, constitutional culture—generally, as a mental model—helps understand constitutionalism generally. A specific kind of constitutional culture (one that includes willingness to be bound) is a necessary condition for successful constitutionalism.
Representative countries include the US, Argentina, and Japan (although the latter adopted Madisonian judicialism and constitutional entrenchment, if not US-style federalism and presidentialism).
Representative countries include the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada to a large extent; for details, see Gardbaum (2001).
Representative countries include France, Russia, and most of Eastern Europe.
Lapsing for a moment from humble pattern prediction to point prediction of the most hubristic order (see Hayek 1967), I am venturing the prediction that the Iraqi constitution will not stick because the textual idealism of Madisonian constitutionalism (combined, perhaps, with the dictates of Realpolitik and US strategic interests) has eclipsed careful study of Iraq’s constitutional culture(s).
A friend in a constitutionally unstable country calls me for help. He has a can of food but no can opener. Easy. I drop a can opener into a Federal Express package. Two days later, he receives the package and opens his can. So he calls me again. This time, he says that his country’s constitution is terrible, whereas the US Constitution has worked pretty well. So I put a copy of the US Constitution in a Federal Express package and send it to him… Why aren’t constitutions like can openers? I thank Peter Boettke for this example.
See Rand (1966, 322–325) on the patent philosophical absurdity of positive “rights,” which imply, ipso facto, a violation of the negative rights of those forced to provide goods or services to those for whom an alleged positive “right” is created by the state.
Including constitutional success and political stability, of course, but also rule of law, transparency and predictability of legislation, limited regulation, political and economic freedom, respect for property rights and contracts, etc.
And, arguably, even that freedom is relative. We need only look at the “free” US, where nearly one half of economic activity is controlled by the government (and thus confiscated from individuals), if indirectly; where laws on searches and respect for habeas corpus are becoming increasingly dodgy; and where large swaths of the economy's commanding heights are facing de facto nationalization.
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Acknowledgements
For the discussion and comments, many thanks to Richard Wagner, Peter Boettke, Dragos Aligica, Don Boudreaux, David Levy, Mark Patton, Jim Loveland, Eduardo Stordeur, Bill Butos, participants at the 2008 meeting of the Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, the Henry C. Simons Circle, and an anonymous referee. Thanks also to George Mount for the research assistance. Financial support from the H.B. Earhart Foundation, the Hayek Fund at the Institute for Humane Studies, and the Mercatus Center at George Mason University is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Wenzel, N. From contract to mental model: Constitutional culture as a fact of the social sciences. Rev Austrian Econ 23, 55–78 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-009-0086-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-009-0086-4
Keywords
- Constitutional culture
- Mental models
- Constitutional political economy
- Constitutional maintenance
- Informal institutions