Abstract
Purpose
Recent studies have demonstrated that various diseases states (e.g., schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s disease) and events (e.g., a stroke) alter a person’s perception of their physical and mental status. Most often this involves alterations in a person’s metacognitive capabilities, and this can question the conceptual model of quality of life (QoL) based on a “perspectivist” approach.
Methods
Using the example of schizophrenia, we applied a philosophical model, developed by Griffin, to deal with this potential threat to the validity of QoL assessment.
Results
Patients with schizophrenia are at risk for being impaired in their ability to assess their QoL. We hypothesise that metacognition (i.e., the ability to attribute mental states in terms of beliefs and goals to one’s self and others) is a formal condition to assess QoL. This particular skill is important because self-reflection is necessary for making a qualitative judgment. A link between this psychological concept and the philosophical concept of reflexivity may be established. We propose a conceptual approach to QoL that takes into account the patient’s reflexivity. This approach is derived from Griffin’s theory based on the list of “prudential values” and the satisfaction of the informed desires of the individual.
Conclusion
The ability of patients to evaluate and value their life should be considered to enrich the concept of QoL. The approach derived from Griffin’s theory might constitute a new avenue for QoL research.
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Appendix: Presentation of the main philosophical concepts and authors cited
Appendix: Presentation of the main philosophical concepts and authors cited
Reflexivity is an abstract logical concept. It refers to the relation a term has with itself, and by extension to the relation between a term of a nature N and another term of the same nature N. Besides logic, this concept has been traditionally developed in philosophy to conceptualise consciousness, and the fact that a person cannot think without thinking he is thinking. Since Locke [71], (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690), the reflexive relation of thoughts about thoughts, or “cognitive reflexivity”, has been extensively explored in philosophy, and more recently in psychology or cognitive sciences. However, another form of reflexivity of desires about desires or “conative reflexivity” is not yet fully explored and presents a certain interest to conceptualise evaluation of QoL. Reflexivity does not denote here a sophisticated intellectual ability or skill.
First-order and second-order desires First-order desires are immediate desires for a particular action (e.g., to drink whisky) or object (e.g., to desire this glass of whisky). Second-order desires are desires about immediate, first-order desires. For example, a second-order desire is a desire not to be driven by the first-order desire to drink whisky. As a consequence, I am in harmony with myself when I have the second-order desire that my first-order desires come about.
Frankfurt, Harry Gordon (1929) American philosopher. His work during the 1970s on the concept of the self, on first and second-order desires, on personal identity and on the concept of “autonomy” has been very influential and much debated in moral philosophy. Among contemporary moral philosophers, he is one of the first who takes into account the importance of complexity in the relation individuals have to themselves in the conduct of life.
Griffin James (1933) American-born philosopher. He theorised a robust account of well-being or QoL in 1986 based on an extended critic of the three dominant QoL theories. These theories, called hedonism (the reduction in QoL to pleasure, mental states or feelings), preferentialism (equation of QoL with the satisfaction of individuals’ preferences or desires) and perfectionism (QoL as related to the realisation of an ideal form of life, objectively defined), present serious defaults. Griffin elaborated a theoretical compromise, showing that QoL cannot be properly understood without reference to “objective” non-individual values. Desires and values are codetermined. He suggested that QoL relies on the evaluations that individuals make of their lives.
Thought experiment speculative method. In philosophy, a thought experiment generally starts with “what would happen if…?” and aims at drawing a general conclusion about a concept from a counterfactual situation. It is not a demonstration.
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Blanc, J., Boyer, L., Le Coz, P. et al. Metacognition: towards a new approach to quality of life. Qual Life Res 23, 467–475 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11136-013-0485-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11136-013-0485-7