Abstract
The power of people and the power of some people over others have long been a topic in sociology, politics, psychology, and, to a lesser extent, economics. This paper shows how cooperative game theory can be used to analyze the power relation between agents 1 and 2. First, we identify payoff reflections of the power of agent 1 over agent 2. Second, we suggest how to look for action reflections of power-over. We will provide many examples and reconsider (an important part of) the power-over literature from the viewpoint of our approach.
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Wiese, H. Applying cooperative game theory to power relations. Qual Quant 43, 519–533 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-007-9134-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-007-9134-y