Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Insincere voting under the successive procedure

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Most European parliaments use the successive procedure to reach decisions. This means that a parliament votes feasible alternatives one-by-one in a pre-determined order until one of them obtains a majority of votes. The paper has two objectives. First, I sketch a simple method making it easy to uncover instances of successful insincere voting under the successive procedure. Second, by focusing on data from one national assembly consistently using this procedure, I demonstrate that insincere or strategic voting is very rare. The finding does not indicate that politicians necessarily behave in a non-strategic or unsophisticated manner. It means only that strategic maneuvers may take place at earlier stages of the decision-making process, for example, in designing the voting agenda.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. In contrast, the literature on strategic voting in mass elections is rapidly increasing. Most analyses consider plurality elections, but there are also some studies of run-off and list PR systems (Cox 1997; Abramson et al. 2010). In general, the effect of strategic voting is to impose a limit on the number of viable candidates or lists, and smaller parties tend to lose votes to major parties. Worth noting is that strategic voting is widespread, particularly in electoral systems with small constituencies.

  2. Less favorable conditions could mean situations with a disciplined majority party or majority cabinet. Or they could refer to parliaments with restrictive rather than open rules, and limited capacity for the opposition to make serious, well-founded proposals on their own.

  3. But see Miller (1995), Bjurulf and Niemi (1978), and Grofman (1981).

  4. Schwartz (2008) identifies three types of procedures (agendas). He uses the names “Euro-Latin,” “Mex-Italian,” and “Anglo-American.” The first one is a successive procedure, and the latter an amendment procedure. Schwartz unfortunately lacks any justification or documentation as to the claims he makes on where the various procedures are used, but he is right in emphasizing the difficulties of establishing a credible procedural geography.

  5. See, e.g., Pappi (1992) (the German Bundestag), Bütikofer and Hug (2010) (Swiss parliament), and Ramstedt (1961) (the Nordic countries, France, Germany, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and various international organizations).

  6. In reality, the procedure compares subsets of alternatives. The comparisons, however, are done such that the subsets have all but one element in common.

  7. It can be argued that the US House vote on impeachment of President Clinton in fact was based on the successive procedure. After a motion to adjourn had been rejected, and a motion to table appeal was voted down, the House proceeded with votes on each of four (compatible) articles of impeachment. If, for example, the motion to adjourn had been accepted, further voting at least would have been interrupted. See Kurrild-Klitgaard (2000) for an interesting analysis of this case.

  8. Because it deals with strategic voting in the context of the amendment procedure, strategic voting in most of the literature is said to occur when legislators vote against their most preferred alternative at one stage of the voting process in order to produce an outcome at the final stage that is better than it otherwise would be. In the successive context, strategic voting must be defined differently, and does not involve voting contrary to one’s preferences in any straightforward sense.

  9. On Finland, also see Lagerspetz (1993).

  10. Rasch (1990) analysed a case from 1988, and found that at most two of 157 MPs voted insincerely. One of them or both likely believed that their action would affect the outcome of the voting process, but, as it turned out, their votes were not pivotal. Thus, it was a case of unsuccessful insincere voting.

  11. See Norwegian parliamentary records S.tid. pp. 118–123 for 1992–1993.

  12. See Norwegian parliamentary records S.tid. pp. 3689–3691, 1997–1998.

References

  • Abramson, P. R., Aldrich, J. H., Blais, A., Diamond, M., Diskin, A., Indridason, I. H., Lee, D. J., & Levine, R. (2010). Comparing strategic voting under FPTP and PR. Comparative Political Studies, 43, 61–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Austen-Smith, D. (1987). Sophisticated sincerity: voting over endogeneous agendas. American Political Science Review, 81, 1323–1329.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Austen-Smith, D. (1993). Explaining the vote: constituency constraints on sophisticated voting. In K. Binmore et al. (Eds.), Frontiers of game theory, Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Banks, J. S. (1985). Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control. Social Choice and Welfare, 1, 295–306.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bjurulf, B. (1973). A simulation analysis of selected voting procedures. Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, 76, 1–61.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bjurulf, B. H., & Niemi, R. G. (1978). Strategic voting in Scandinavian parliaments. Scandinavian Political Studies, 1, 5–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bütikofer, S., & Hug, S. (2010). Strategic behavior in parliament. Unpublished.

  • Calvert, R., & Fenno, R. (1994). Strategy and sophisticated voting in the Senate. Journal of Politics, 56, 349–376.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cox, G. W. (1997). Making votes count: strategic coordination in the world’s electoral systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Denzau, A. T., Riker, W. H., & Shepsle, K. A. (1985). Farquharson and Fenno: sophisticated voting and home style. American Political Science Review, 79, 1117–1134.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dummett, M. (1984). Voting procedures. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Döring, H. (Ed.) (1995). Parliaments and majority rule in Western Europe. Frankfurt: Campus.

    Google Scholar 

  • Enelow, J., & Koehler, D. (1980). The amendment in legislative strategy: sophisticated voting in the U.S. Congress. Journal of Politics, 42, 396–413.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Farquharson, R. (1969). Theory of voting. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gibbard, A. (1973). Manipulation of voting schemes. Econometrica, 41, 587–601.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grofman, B. (1981). The theory of committees and elections: the legacy of Duncan Black. In G. Tullock (Ed.), Towards a science of politics: essays in honor of Duncan Black, Blacksburg: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Groseclose, T., & Milyo, J. (2010). Sincere versus sophisticated voting in Congress: theory and evidence. Journal of Politics, 72, 60–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hadenius, A. (1981). Spelet om skatten. Rationalistisk analys av politiskt beslutsfattande. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hylland, A. (1976). Strategy-proof voting procedures for single-peaked preferences. Unpublished paper. Department of Political Science, University of Oslo.

  • Hylland, A. (2006). The Condorcet paradox in theory and practice. In J. Elster, O. Gjelsvik, A. Hylland, & K. Moene (Eds.), Understanding choice, explaining behaviour. Essays in honour of Ole-Jørgen Skog, Oslo: Oslo Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jenkins, J. A., & Munger, M. C. (2003). Investigating the incidence of killer amendments in Congress. The Journal of Politics, 65, 498–517.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jung, J. P. (1989). Condorcet consistent binary agendas under incomplete information. In P. C. Ordeshook (Ed.), Models of strategic choice in politics, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krehbiel, K., & Rivers, D. (1990). Sophisticated voting in Congress: a reconsideration. Journal of Politics, 52, 548–578.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (2000). Voting, agenda control and the Clinton impeachment. Presented at annual meeting of European Public Choice Society, 26–30 April, Siena.

  • Lagerspetz, E. (1993). Social choice in the real world. Scandinavian Political Studies, 16, 1–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewin, L. (1988). Ideology and strategy: a century of Swedish politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mackie, G. (2003). Democracy defended. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • McKelvey, R. D., & Niemi, R. G. (1978). A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures. Journal of Economic Theory, 18, 1–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Merrill, S. III (1988). Making multicandidate elections more democratic. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, N. R. (1980). A new solution set for tournaments and majority voting. American Journal of Political Science, 24, 68–96.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, N. R. (1995). Committees, agendas, and voting. Chur: Harwood Academic.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morrow, J. D. (1994). Game theory for political scientists. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nurmi, H. (1983). Voting procedures: a summary analysis. British Journal of Political Science, 13, 181–208.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nurmi, H. (1987). Comparing voting systems. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Nurmi, H. (1997). Referendum design: an exercise in applied social choice theory. Scandinavian Political Studies, 20, 33–52.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ordeshook, P. C., & Schwartz, T. (1987). Agendas and the control of political outcomes. American Political Science Review, 81, 179–199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ordeshook, P. C., & Palfrey, T. R. (1988). Agendas, strategic voting, and signaling with incomplete information. American Journal of Political Science, 32, 441–466.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pappi, F. U. (1992). Die Abstimmungsreihenfolge der Anträge zum Parlaments- und Regierungssitz am 20. Juni 1991 im Deutschen Bundestag. Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 23, 403–412.

    Google Scholar 

  • Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (1997). Congress: a political-economic history of roll call voting. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ramstedt, T. (1961). In Parlamentarisk beslutsteknik. SOU 1961:21. Stockholm: Förfatningsutredningen.

  • Rasch, B. E. (1987). Manipulation and strategic voting in the Norwegian parliament. Public Choice, 52, 57–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rasch, B. E. (1990). Lokket av Pandoras krukke: en voteringsteoretisk analyse av Strotingets Hurum-vedtak (The lid off Pandoras’ box: a voting analysis of the Hurum decision in the Storting). In K. Midgaard (Ed.), Oppstyr og styring rundt flyplass, Oslo: Dreyer Akademisk.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rasch, B. E. (1995). Parliamentary voting procedures. In H. Döring (Ed.), Parliaments and majority rule in Western Europe, Frankfurt: Campus.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rasch, B. E. (1998). Var det flertall for ny opera? Stat og styring no. 4/98.

  • Rasch, B. E. (2000). Parliamentary floor voting procedures and agenda setting in Europe. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 25, 3–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rasch, B. E. (2011). Norway: institutionally weak governments and parliamentary voting on bills. In B. E. Rasch & G. Tsebelis (Eds.), The role of governments in legislative agenda setting, London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rasch, B. E., & Congleton, R. D. (2006). Amendment procedures and constitutional stability. In R. D. Congleton & B. Swedenborg (Eds.), Democratic constitutional change and public policy: analysis and evidence, Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rasch, B. E. & Tsebelis, G. (Eds.) (2011). The role of governments in legislative agenda setting. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Riker, W. H. (1982). Liberalism against populism. A confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice. San Francisco: Freeman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Riker, W. H. (1986). The art of political manipulation. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Satterthwaite, M. (1975). Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions. Journal of Economic Theory, 10, 187–217.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schwartz, T. (2008). Parliamentary procedure: principal forms and political effects. Public Choice, 136, 353–377.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. (1984). Uncovered sets and sophisticated voting outcomes with implications for agenda institutions. American Journal of Political Science, 28, 49–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wilkerson, J. D. (1990). Reelection and representation in conflict: the case of agenda manipulation. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 15, 263–282.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wilkerson, J. D. (1999). Killer amendments in Congress. American Political Science Review, 93, 535–552.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of the paper have been presented at the 2007 World Meeting of Public Choice Society, Amsterdam, and at the 2012 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Antwerp. Thanks to the participants, in particular Bernard Grofman, Hannu Nurmi, Howard Rosenthal, Ulrich Sieberer, Arco Timmermans, Radoslaw Zubek, and to three anonymous reviewers for comments and encouragement. This research has been supported by the Norwegian Research Council (project No. 222442).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1097, Blindern, 0317, Oslo, Norway

    Bjørn Erik Rasch

Authors
  1. Bjørn Erik Rasch
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Bjørn Erik Rasch.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Rasch, B.E. Insincere voting under the successive procedure. Public Choice 158, 499–511 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-0054-6

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-0054-6

Keywords

Search

Navigation