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Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock

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Abstract

Gordon Tullock, nearly a half century ago, raised questions about Arrow’s Theorem (“a phantom has stalked the classrooms and seminars of economics and political science”). He followed this up by asking, in light of Arrow’s Theorem, “Why so much stability?” In this paper a more nuanced understanding of the operating characteristics of majority rule in institutional settings, anticipated and stimulated by Tullock, is spelled out. A major distinction is made between preference cycles and voting cycles, suggesting why Arrow’s phantom still stalks, but that Tullock’s intuitions are germane as well.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Government and Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA

    Kenneth A. Shepsle

  2. Department of Political Science and Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, USA

    Barry R. Weingast

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  1. Kenneth A. Shepsle
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  2. Barry R. Weingast
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Correspondence to Kenneth A. Shepsle.

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Shepsle, K.A., Weingast, B.R. Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock. Public Choice 152, 83–95 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9853-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9853-4

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