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The economic theory of rent seeking

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Abstract

Tullock’s concept of rent seeking was the first statement of a quantitative principle about the social costs of such activities as lobbying and favor seeking. As such, this part of Tullock’s legacy to modern economics is one of his most important contributions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, 29634, USA

    Robert D. Tollison

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  1. Robert D. Tollison
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Correspondence to Robert D. Tollison.

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Tollison, R.D. The economic theory of rent seeking. Public Choice 152, 73–82 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9852-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9852-5

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