Abstract
Government by majority rule voting is a mixture of voting and bargaining. Bargaining among people with moderately different objectives is indispensable for the passage of laws and the formation of public policy. Little of the nation’s business could be transacted without an ability on the part of the legislators and members of political parties to strike bargains, but that same ability to strike bargains makes possible the exploitation of minorities by majorities which, beyond some limit, destroys democratic government. Rules and customs are designed to foster bargaining in the one context and to thwart bargaining in the other.
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Usher, D. Bargaining and voting. Public Choice 151, 739–755 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9768-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9768-0