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The political economy of the environmental criminal justice system: a production function approach

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Abstract

The criminal justice system combines at least three distinct institutions, police, prosecutors, and courts, in order to enforce key regulations. Focusing on criminal environmental law contained in the German Penal Code, this paper empirically studies the determinants of enforcement decisions at the levels of the police, prosecutors, and judges using a production function approach. We focus particularly on the role of economic and political factors and their comparison across institutions. The results of the panel data analysis show evidence for the presence of economic factors determining behavior at all levels. Political factors impact especially on police and court behavior.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and Oeschger Centre for Climate Change Research, University of Bern, Schanzeneckstrasse 1, 3001, Bern, Switzerland

    Christian Almer

  2. Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg, Bergheimer Str. 20, 69115, Heidelberg, Germany

    Timo Goeschl

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  1. Christian Almer
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  2. Timo Goeschl
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Correspondence to Christian Almer.

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Almer, C., Goeschl, T. The political economy of the environmental criminal justice system: a production function approach. Public Choice 148, 611–630 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9687-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9687-5

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