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The decision to lobby bureaucrats

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Abstract

Despite a good deal of interest in lobbyists’ tactics, virtually no research has been published examining the conditions under which interest groups lobby the bureaucracy rather than or in addition to the legislature. Using two comprehensive datasets, I show that lobbying increases in both branches when conflict is higher and when the lobbyist has professional or political connections to that venue. In addition, certain conditions cause lobbyists to specialize in one branch or a particular branch only, depending on the issue area being lobbied, the interest group type being represented, the lobbyist’s resources, and other factors.

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  1. Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA

    Amy Melissa McKay

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  1. Amy Melissa McKay
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Correspondence to Amy Melissa McKay.

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McKay, A.M. The decision to lobby bureaucrats. Public Choice 147, 123–138 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9607-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9607-8

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