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Expectations of government’s response to disaster

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Abstract

Citizens’ expectations about what government is capable of doing and what policies government officials intend to pursue can influence their decisions. After a disaster, for instance, expectations of government’s intent and capacity to assist in the rebuilding process will influence the rebuilding strategies that affected citizens adopt. This article develops a typology that categorizes citizens’ expectations of government response to disaster. We then deploy this typology to identify expectation patterns among residents and other private actors in New Orleans’ Ninth Ward communities who have returned following Katrina and explain how these expectations shape their preferred rebuilding strategy.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and Management, Beloit College, 700 College St., Beloit, WI, 53511, USA

    Emily Chamlee-Wright

  2. Mercatus Center, George Mason University, 3301 North Fairfax Drive, Suite 450, Arlington, VA, 22201-4433, USA

    Virgil Henry Storr

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  1. Emily Chamlee-Wright
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  2. Virgil Henry Storr
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Correspondence to Virgil Henry Storr.

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Chamlee-Wright, E., Storr, V.H. Expectations of government’s response to disaster. Public Choice 144, 253–274 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9516-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9516-x

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