Abstract
The collective choice of public consumption expenditure is reconsidered when voters are socially mobile. In accordance with previous work on social mobility and political economics, the analysis concerns a class of mobility processes that induce mappings from initial income to expected future income that are monotonically increasing and concave. The paper abstracts from the explicitly redistributive role of government and concentrates on public consumption which is modeled as a classical public good. In equilibrium, provision is sensitive to the degree of social mobility, theoretically linking social mobility to public consumption. Further, empirical puzzles about the impact of voting franchise extensions on the growth of government spending are addressed within the context of social mobility.
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Dorsch, M. Social mobility and the demand for public consumption expenditures. Public Choice 142, 25–39 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9469-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9469-0