Abstract
Taken from an infinite set of divisors methods, the D’Hondt formula is the unique rule that maximizes the minimum number of seats for parties exceeding average size but not surpassing an absolute majority of the votes. This property is also shared, in the quota set of methods, by the Droop formula. At the same time, these two methods are those most commonly observed in practice. This paper relates the property stated to the observed facts. If parties try to maximize the minimum number of seats for a given share of votes, then the D’Hondt formula should be chosen. This choice is consistent with rational parties that make institutional choices in an uncertain environment.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Andrews, J. T., & Jackman, R. W. (2005). Strategic fools: electoral rule choice under extreme uncertainty. Electoral Studies, 24, 65–84.
Balinski, M., & Rachev, S. T. (1997). Rounding proportions: methods of rounding. The Mathematical Scientist, 22, 1–26.
Balinski, M., & Young, H. P. (2001). Fair representation: meeting the ideal of one man, one vote (2nd ed.). Washington: Brookings Institution.
Benoit, K. (2004). Models of electoral system change. Electoral Studies, 23, 363–389.
Blais, A., Dobrzynska, A., & Indridason, I. H. (2004). To adopt or not to adopt proportional representation: the politics of institutional choice. British Journal of Political Science, 34, 182–190.
Boix, C. (1999). Setting the rules of the game: the choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies. American Political Science Review, 93, 609–26.
Golder, M. (2005). Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946–2000. Electoral Studies, 24, 103–121.
May, K. O. (1952). A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision. Econometrica, 20, 680–684.
Penadés, A. (2000). Los sistemas elementales de representación. Tesis Doctoral, Instituto Juan March, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Madrid.
Penadés, A. (2005). La elección de los sistemas electorales en las primeras democracias, 1890–1940. Zona Abierta, 110111, 199–278.
Penadés, A. (2006). Remarks on the theory of apportionment: the analysis of electoral formulas and their threshold functions. Presented at the II Biannual Conference of the Center for the Advanced Study of the Social Sciences at the Juan March Institute, Madrid, 14–15 June.
Penadés, A. (2007). Thresholds and bounds for divisor and quota methods of apportionment. Instituto Juan March, CEACS. Working Paper 2007/234.
Przeworski, A. (2005). Democracy as an equilibrium. Public Choice, 123, 253–273.
Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the market: political and economic reforms in eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
de Córdoba, G.F., Penadés, A. Institutionalizing uncertainty: the choice of electoral formulas. Public Choice 141, 391–403 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9460-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9460-9