Abstract
Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan is one of the most important treatises in the history of political economy and has influenced writings on constitutional economics and public choice. In his treatise, Hobbes proposed the desirability of voluntary subjugation to an authoritarian ruler. Hobbes appealed to the authority of the prophet Samuel to make his case for Leviathan, a precedent that has remained unquestioned for some 350 years. Yet Samuel clearly warned against the dangers of appointing an all-powerful king. Hobbes’s argument in favor of Leviathan thus demands an authority other than Samuel.
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Hillman, A.L. Hobbes and the prophet Samuel on leviathan government. Public Choice 141, 1–4 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9447-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9447-6