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Ideological extremism and electoral design. Multimember versus single member districts

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Abstract

Relying on a formal theoretical model, Gary Cox demonstrates that single member districts induce candidates toward policy positions at their constituency median while multimember districts encourage dispersion. We test this theoretical implication in the context of the Arizona state legislature, in which each legislative district chooses one senator and two representatives in single member and multimember contests respectively. To do so, we generate W-NOMINATE estimates of scores based on roll-call data from the Arizona state legislature that are comparable across chambers (Senate and House). Our results are substantially less supportive of the formal theory than are those of prior studies.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Public Administration and Policy and Department of Political Science, University of Georgia, 204 Baldwin Hall, Athens, GA, 30605, USA

    Anthony Bertelli

  2. School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK

    Anthony Bertelli

  3. Truman School of Public Affairs, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, USA

    Lilliard E. Richardson Jr.

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  1. Anthony Bertelli
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Correspondence to Anthony Bertelli.

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Bertelli, A., Richardson, L.E. Ideological extremism and electoral design. Multimember versus single member districts. Public Choice 137, 347–368 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9332-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9332-8

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