Abstract
This paper shows that a policy that uniformly increases contestants’ effort costs can lead to an increase in total effort. In asymmetric settings, this “levels the playing field” and therefore encourages weaker players (who otherwise would have stayed out) to enter. Paradoxically, a contest designer whose only objective is to maximize total effort may thus wish to make rent-seeking “more difficult.” These results suggest that the often-lamented bureaucratic red tape might in fact be a rational response to the problem of attracting lobbyists to participate in a contest.
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Ritz, R.A. Influencing rent-seeking contests. Public Choice 135, 291–300 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9263-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9263-9