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Spontaneous order and the common law: Gordon Tullock’s critique

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Abstract

Gordon Tullock critiques two specific aspects of the common law system: the adversary system of dispute resolution and the common law process of rulemaking, contrasting them with the inquisitorial system and the civil law systems respectively. Tullock’s general critique is straightforward: litigation under the common law system is plagued by the same rent-seeking and rent-dissipation dynamics that Tullock famously ascribed to the process of legislative rent-seeking. The article concludes that Tullock’s critique of the adversary system appears to be stronger on both theoretical and empirical grounds than his critique of the common law system of rulemaking.

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  1. George Mason University School of Law, James Buchanan Center for Political Economy, Program on Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 3301 N. Fairfax Dr., Arlington, VA, 22201, USA

    Todd J. Zywicki

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Correspondence to Todd J. Zywicki.

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Zywicki, T.J. Spontaneous order and the common law: Gordon Tullock’s critique. Public Choice 135, 35–53 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9245-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9245-y

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