Abstract
In spatial voting games without a core, if candidates are constrained on one issue, they are implicitly constrained on other issues. Thus external constraints affect optimal positions for candidates. Using new solution concepts, we find the optimal position for a candidate given any linear constraint, given an opponent’s constraint, and determine conditions when constraints are sufficient to yield unbeatable positions.
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Beeler Asay, G.R. How does ideology matter in the spatial model of voting?. Public Choice 135, 109–123 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9241-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9241-2