Abstract
The literature suggests that democracy positively affects environmental policy stringency. Using the method of propensity score matching, we find that this result appears to be largely driven by the parliamentary democracies (as opposed to the presidential-congressional, proportional or majority systems). Moreover, it appears that presidential-congressional systems often set environmental policies not significantly different from autocracies. These are novel contributions to the literature.
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JEL Codes: D7, H1, Q28
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Fredriksson, P.G., Wollscheid, J.R. Democratic institutions versus autocratic regimes: The case of environmental policy. Public Choice 130, 381–393 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9093-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9093-1