Abstract
In non-hierarchical environments such as teams and honor codes, effective self-management requires members to simultaneously address their dual roles as worker (agent) and monitor (principal). We employ an evolutionary analysis of teamwork where ethical behavior is voluntary, repetitive and related to an established norm. The explicit recognition of monitor–worker duality results in a unique and intuitive social contract that specifies the punishment must fit the crime. Our results are consistent with examples of successful team production, unraveling honor codes at colleges and teamwork and ethics as part of the MBA curriculum.
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Arce M., D.G., Gunn, L.B. Working Well with Others: The Evolution of Teamwork and Ethics. Public Choice 123, 115–131 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-7523-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-7523-0