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Evidence on the importance of spatial voting models in presidential nominations and elections

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Abstract

ADA scores and Nominate scores are used for the first time to examine the influence of spatial voting records on which candidate wins the party’s presidential nomination and on which nominee wins the general election. We find that the most conservative Republican candidate and moderately liberal Democrats were most likely to win their party’s nomination. For general elections we find that the candidate’s spatial record has nearly as much impact on the outcome as economic growth, which has been the focus of most past empirical research. The nominee whose voting record is more moderate is more likely to be elected.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, 32611-7140, U.S.A.

    Lawrence W. Kenny

  2. Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, 32611-7145, U.S.A.

    Babak Lotfinia

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  1. Lawrence W. Kenny
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  2. Babak Lotfinia
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Correspondence to Lawrence W. Kenny.

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Kenny, L.W., Lotfinia, B. Evidence on the importance of spatial voting models in presidential nominations and elections. Public Choice 123, 439–462 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-7170-5

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