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Thinking About the Political Impacts of the Electoral College

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Correspondence to Bernard Grofman.

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The senior author is indebted to helpful conversations over the years with Guillermo Owen about the topics discussed in this paper and to a recent conversation with Alan Natapoff. Errors remaining are solely the responsibility of the authors.

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Grofman, B., Feld, S.L. Thinking About the Political Impacts of the Electoral College. Public Choice 123, 1–18 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-3210-4

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