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Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:

A numerical analysis of a contest success function model

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Abstract

This paper investigates the behavior of rent-seeking politicians in an environment of increasing economic integration. The focus of the paper is on the implications of globalization-induced political yardstick competition for constitutional design with a view to the current discussion in the European Union. In contrast to the established literature, we carefully portray the double-tiered government structure in federal systems. The number of lower-tier governments and the allocation of policy responsibilities to the two levels of government are subject to constitutional choice.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Northwestern University, 2003 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Illinois, 60208, U.S.A.

    Martin Bodenstein

  2. Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Box D-138, 78457, Konstanz, Germany

    Heinrich W. Ursprung

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  1. Martin Bodenstein
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  2. Heinrich W. Ursprung
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Correspondence to Heinrich W. Ursprung.

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Bodenstein, M., Ursprung, H.W. Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:. Public Choice 124, 329–352 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-2051-5

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