Abstract
This paper explores whether invoking social norms, in the context of a persuasive appeal, affects individuals’ willingness to take action for the public good. The framework I develop brings together a host of factors treated as distinct in past work, including attitudes, rhetoric, and social norms. I test predictions from this framework in an experiment that focuses on a particularly important behavior—actions regarding the consumption of energy. I find that highlighting norms in the context of an appeal for energy conservation increases the importance individuals’ associate with these actions, intentions to conserve energy, and actual behavior on a light-bulb purchasing decision. The findings have implications more generally for understanding when individuals take actions that promote the public good.
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Notes
Allcott (2010, p. 5) explains that “because some externalities, primarily from power plant greenhouse gas emissions, are not internalized in electricity prices, many consumers perceive that energy conservation helps provide a public good (more moderate global climate).”
This is important given the debate over the validity of intention measures as predictors of behavior—e.g., literature analyzing voter turnout (see Vavreck 2007); also, see Chandon et al. (2005) for research in marketing on consumers’ purchasing choices. In a meta-review of 185 independent studies testing the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen 1991), Armitage and Conner (2001) find that only 19 studies contain overt measures of behavior. But see, Green and Gerber (2010), Lau and Redlawsk (2001).
Whether one’s evaluation toward an object is positive, neutral, or negative depends on the availability, accessibility, and applicability of various considerations about the object (Chong and Druckman 2007).
These studies find that individuals tend to systematically overestimate their own personal influence on outcomes when considering participation in a collective action. The end result of these psychological “miscalculations” is that individuals engage in collective actions at a higher rate than predicted by traditional expected-utility theory.
Norms evolve in communities as a way to regulate social life, and norms can be especially powerful in situations in which an individual’s action causes negative effects on the lives of others (Biel and Thogersen 2007; Thogersen 2008). In these situations, norms serve to restrain egoistic impulses and induce cooperation among group members in providing public goods. For instance, research in behavioral economics on conditional cooperation demonstrates that people are more likely to contribute to the provision of public goods when they perceive others as contributing (Allcott 2010, p. 5; Alpizar et al. 2008; Axelrod 1984; Frey and Meier 2004; Shang and Croson 2004). However, individuals vary in the extent to which they regulate and control their actions when they are being monitored by others (Snyder 1987; Berinsky 2004).
The four locations were: Evanston, IL; Warrenville, IL; Mount Prospect, IL; and, Lovington, IL. I transported the laptops to businesses, libraries, and community centers that generously agreed to provide a conference room to conduct the experimental sessions. Collecting data from multiple sites increased the heterogeneity of my sample; however, the location of administrative sites may have depressed the validity of some of the measurement scales described below because of increased opportunity to conserve energy in urban areas (e.g., access to public transportation).
See Table 3 in the Appendix for details on the demographic composition of the sample.
Subjects in the pre-test were asked to evaluate one of two versions of an editorial and whether it encourages or discourages “individuals taking personal steps to reduce energy consumption” (on a 7-point scale where 1 = “definitely opposes taking steps” and 7 = “definitely supports taking steps”). Subjects did perceive differences as to whether the editorial advocates or discourages taking personal steps to reduce energy consumption (p < .001), with the mean score for the pro-action editorial at 6.09 and the mean score for the no-action editorial at 2.74. In addition, individuals were asked to assess whether reading each editorial would decrease or increase their likelihood of conserving energy (on a 7 point scale where 1 = “definitely decreases likelihood” and 7 = “definitely increases likelihood”). The means for this question were 5.12 after reading the pro-action editorial and 3.59 after reading the editorial questioning the importance of taking personal steps (p < .001). Both articles were rated as equally easy to read and understand, and there were no differences in perceptions of how effective the editorials were in terms of making the case for conservation (means of 4.91 and 4.56 on a seven point scale for “how effective each article is in making its case”).
In contrast, participants assigned to no-norms sessions read an unrelated press release. The full text of each press release is included in the Appendix.
This ensures that individuals have knowledge about prevailing behavioral standards in a decision context and a belief that their expressed intentions and actions are subject to monitoring by others. I acknowledge that this may also induce social desirability effects in which respondents seek to behave in socially desirable ways (see Streb et al. 2008; Berinsky 2002; Kuklinski et al. 1997; Sniderman and Carmines 1997).
The question was worded as follows: “A standard light bulb costs about $.50. An energy efficient light bulb is more expensive. What is the maximum amount you would be willing to pay for one energy efficient light bulb? Please enter an amount ranging from $.50 to $10.00 in the space provided below.” This protocol is an open-ended method of contingent valuation used to value environmental goods (Green et al. 1998; McFadden 1994).
As a randomization check, I regressed each condition on demographic and individual-level variables including gender, education, party affiliation, political ideology, and key values measures (universalism, egalitarianism). The randomization check confirmed that these variables were unrelated to condition assignment.
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Acknowledgments
I thank Dennis Chong, Fay Lomax Cook, James N. Druckman, Jennifer Jerit, Martin Johnson, Peter Loewen, Sean Richey, and Kim Mannemar Sonderskon for comments on this manuscript. I thank Lindsey Herbel and Veronica Luckow for research assistance. The research was supported by a Graduate Research Grant from Northwestern University.
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Appendix
Appendix
Press Release—Pro-Behavior Norm
Cook County Residents Committed to Reducing Energy Consumption
Researchers at Northwestern University have released the results of a study on energy attitudes among Cook County residents. One of the more notable findings is the considerable extent to which residents are willing to take steps to reduce personal energy consumption. For example, the vast majority of respondents said that the next time they buy a car they will consider energy efficient alternatives, and most respondents said that they have, or intend to buy, energy-efficient light bulbs. Also, nearly 90% reported that it is “very important” that all Americans purchase energy efficient light bulbs even though they are more costly. Full details of the study are available at www.northwestern.edu/cookcounty/energysurvey.
Press Release—Control Group (No Norm)
Cook County Residents Say Economy is the Most Important Issue Facing Nation
Researchers at Northwestern University have released the results from a study on issues important to Cook County residents in the upcoming presidential election. Similar to the results from national polls, 36% of respondents said that the general economic situation is the most important issue facing the nation. The situation in Iraq was the second most frequently cited problem with 20% of the sample volunteering this response. Other issues cited as important included immigration policy, energy and fuel costs, and health care costs. Full details of the study are available at www.northwestern.edu/cookcounty/electionsurvey.
Editorial (Pro Action—Consumers)
Editorial: Your Choices about Energy Consumption Matter
Energy is essential to the economic activity that sustains and improves the quality of our lives. But in the last 25 years, world energy demand has increased about 60%, raising questions about how to address the increased energy usage.
Some argue that the government needs to take responsibility. Others say the responsibility lies more with individuals’ consumption decisions. Along these lines, a recent report from McKinsey Global Organization found that the growth rate of worldwide energy consumption could be cut substantially through more aggressive energy-efficiency efforts by households. For instance, switching from familiar, incandescent light bulbs to longer-lasting, energy-saving compact fluorescent bulbs would save consumers billions of dollars annually and save the world from millions of metric tons of greenhouse gases. Compact fluorescent light bulbs are only slightly more costly than conventional bulbs, yet consume 75% less electricity. “This is not a sacrifice deal,” Roger Walker, head of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, says of energy conservation. “This is a technology deal. After all, we’re twice as energy efficient now as we were in the 1970s, and this increase in efficiency is largely a result of consumers’ actions aimed at reducing energy costs. We must continue to urge consumers to make energy efficient choices.”
In July of 2007, the National Petroleum Council released the results of a 2-year study commissioned by U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman. One of five core strategies the report lists to assist markets in meeting energy challenges for 2030 and beyond involves reducing energy demand by increasing the efficiency of transportation and residential energy uses. Thus, consumers will play an increasingly important role in U.S. energy policy in the coming decades. Whether these polices are effective depends on our ability to reduce energy consumption.
Editorial (Pro Action—Government)
Editorial: Government Must Take Action to Achieve Energy Independence
Energy is essential to the economic activity that sustains and improves the quality of our lives. But in the last 25 years, world energy demand has increased about 60%, raising questions about how to address the increased energy usage.
Some argue that individuals should take steps to reduce energy consumption, while others say the government needs to take responsibility. According to the latter group, only government has the capacity to coordinate the actions of millions of individuals and businesses to ensure a stable, reliable energy supply. For instance, a strong financial commitment to research and development of alternative energy sources, such as renewable energies and energy-efficient technologies, might one day free the U.S. from dependence on oil. But the transition from a primarily fossil-fuel-based society to a renewable-energy-society will take decades and require government leadership. Voluntary reductions in personal energy consumption will have a relatively small impact on the nation’s overall energy usage. For example, decisions consumers make about light bulb and appliance purchases will do little to foster a transition away from a reliance on energy produced from burning fossil fuels. Nonetheless, recent energy legislation includes regulations that will actually cost consumers more money in the short term. To assuage voters, politicians hide the price tag when they try to impose conservation. The efficiency standards for appliances, far from paying for themselves, will cost consumers roughly $50 billion through 2050, according to Roger Walker, head of Cambridge Energy Research Associates. Not only do these measures cost consumers a lot, but they also do little to nothing in terms of affecting the nation’s energy situation.
Instead of mandating that individuals pay more for household products and appliances, a successful long-term approach to energy security requires expanding and diversifying energy production by investing in cost–effective energy technologies, providing a reliable energy infrastructure, and funding research and development for environmentally-clean ways to utilize the nation’s vast domestic coal reserves. Thus, it is government, not consumers, who must commit to taking action if we hope to achieve real energy independence.
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Bolsen, T. A Light Bulb Goes On: Norms, Rhetoric, and Actions for the Public Good. Polit Behav 35, 1–20 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-011-9186-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-011-9186-5