Abstract
Several philosophers of education argue that schooling should facilitate students’ development of autonomy. Such arguments fall into two main categories: Student-centered arguments support autonomy education to help enable students to lead good lives; Public-goods-centered arguments support autonomy education to develop students into good citizens. Critics challenge the legitimacy of autonomy education—of the state imposing a schooling curriculum aimed at making children autonomous. In this paper, I offer a unified solution to the challenges of legitimacy that both arguments for autonomy education face. I first defend a particular construal of liberal legitimacy, and then consider each legitimacy challenge in light of that construal. I argue that the legitimacy challenges confronting both types of argument can be overcome. Further, I explain why we should pursue both arguments, rather than resting the entire case for autonomy education on one or the other. I conclude that each argument—if it can justify autonomy education at all—can justify autonomy education consistent with the requirements of liberal democratic legitimacy.
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Notes
See Burtt (2003).
See, for examples, Galston (1992, 1995), Burtt (1994, 1996) and Lomasky (1987). Much of the discussion about the legitimacy of autonomy education focuses on the concerns of religious parents that such an education risks undermining the religious values they hope to share with their children. See, for examples, the discussions of Wisconsin v. Yoder and Mozert v. Hawkins County in Gutmann (1995) and Galston (1995).
The two arguments might diverge in terms of the type of autonomy education they justify as well. Partially for this reason, political liberals should also not be satisfied relying only on the student-centered argument.
For elaboration on the notion of “encumbered selves,” see Sandel (1984).
On the common school ideal, see Callan (1997).
One wrinkle is worth noting: “Civic humanist” versions of public-centered arguments regard civic virtues as intrinsic constituents of a good life. Here I focus instead on “civic republican” versions, which regard civic virtues as instrumentally but not intrinsically valuable. See Rawls (2001, pp. 156–157) and Kymlicka (2002, pp. 287–302).
Plenty of theorists reject neutrality as a constraint on legitimacy, either in general or with respect to education in particular. In favor of neutrality in education, see Rawls (1993), De Wijze (1999) and Costa (2004). Against, see Brighouse (1995), Reich (2002) and Galston (1995). I accept the constraint and argue that autonomy education is compliant with it.
On the side of thinking that the neutrality constraint is robust enough to make a difference, see Rawls (1993) and De Wijze (1999). On the side of thinking that there is (near) total practical convergence between a neutral civic education and one that eschews neutrality, see Gutmann (1995), Callan (1997), Macedo (1995, 2000) and Costa (2004). Some theorists discuss the difference in terms of comprehensively versus politically liberal autonomy education, de-emphasizing the neutrality constraint in political liberalism. See Gutmann (1995), Kymlica (2002, pp. 232–240), Brighouse (1995) and Callan (1996). I discuss the question of convergence at length later in this paper. Proponents of relatively robust autonomy education as a component of civic education include Gutmann (1987, 1995), Macedo (1995), Reich (2002), Costa (2004) and Callan (1996). Rawls (1993) and De Wijze (1999) favor a more restricted education for autonomy. Galston (1992, 1995) and Lomasky (1987) oppose autonomy education as a component of civic education. Categorizing Rawls’s view is complicated. Some (including me) think that his actual recommendations regarding civic education are inconsistent with the principles he invokes to defend them. On this matter, see Callan (1996, 1997), Costa (2004), Davis and Neufeld (2007) and Neufeld (2013).
Critics argue that reciprocal positive regard is not necessary for democratic citizenship; mere tolerance will suffice. See Galston (1992).
See also Callan (1997). Sometimes Gutmann sounds more civic humanist than civic republican. She argues, for example, that “the good of children includes…identification with and participation in the…politics of their society” (1987, p. 726). I focus on the non-perfectionist, public-centered rendering of her view (1995).
Brighouse puts the concern like this: “Although [Gutmann’s] civic education equips citizens to scrutinize the values inculcated, it does not encourage scrutiny. Yet confidence that liberal legitimacy is met requires that the values inculcated have survived critical scrutiny, for only then have we any reason to believe that the commitments are not merely conditioned by the state” (1998, pp. 725–726). See also Edenberg (2016). For a response, see Callan (2000).
Brighouse argues that an autonomy-facilitating education can enable the kind of legitimacy that civic education threatened, by enabling prospective citizens to give reasoned and informed consent to the practices of liberal democratic institutions (1998). As we’ll see, I don’t think civic education threatens legitimacy in the way Brighouse claims, but I argue that we should want autonomy education for students’ own sake even so.
A distinct though related set of legitimacy questions concerns the legitimacy of regimes and governing systems.
He adds that “all questions arising in the legislature that concern…basic questions of justice, should also be settled, so far as possible, by principles and ideals that can be similarly endorsed” (1993, p. 197).
Nor will all adjudicate the weight of competing C-citizenship interests in the same way.
Though this is not a project of Rawls scholarship, I take it that this understanding of neutrality is roughly Rawlsian, despite clearly having implications Rawls did not accept.
On the “convergence thesis,” see Davis and Neufeld (2007). Endorsing the convergence thesis in some form are Gutmann (1995), Callan (1996, 1997), Macedo (1995, 2000) and Costa (2004). Those against it include Rawls (1993), Davis and Neufeld (2007), Neufeld (2013), Edenberg (2016), Fowler (2011), Reich (2002) and De Wijze (1999).
Although I focus on Gutmann’s argument, I think the points I raise can extend to Callan’s (1996) burdens of judgment argument for the convergence thesis as well. (I do not think that the phenomenon I’m describing—prospective citizens accepting the requirements of mutual justifiability without critically engaging with the comprehensive doctrines of others—undermines personal integrity, as Callan worries some ways of resisting the convergence thesis will).
See Galston (1992). The response I propose here can be offered on behalf of both public- and student-centered arguments for autonomy education.
See, for example, De Wijze (1999), Macedo (1995) and Costa (2004). Rawls says “it is surely impossible for the basic structure of a just constitutional regime not to have important effects and influences as to which comprehensive doctrines endure and gain adherents over time; and it is futile to try to counteract these effects and influences… We must accept the facts of commonsense political sociology” (Rawls 1993, p. 193. See also ibid., pp. 192–195).
A positional good is a good whose value for the individual in question is a function of that individual’s place in the overall distribution of that good. The good is more valuable insofar as one has relatively more of it compared to others, and less valuable insofar as one has relatively less. See Hirsch (1976).
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to have received helpful feedback on this paper from many generous readers. I especially would like to thank Harry Brighouse, Shanna Slank, Jeff Behrends, David Sanson, Chris Higgins, Randall Curren, David O’Brien, Danielle Zwarthoed, Brittney Grafelman, Alita Kendrick, Liz Fansler, R. J. Leland, Julian Culp, Christie Hartley, Lori Watson, Blain Neufeld, and Andree-Anne Cormier.
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Schouten, G. Political liberalism and autonomy education: Are citizenship-based arguments enough?. Philos Stud 175, 1071–1093 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1071-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1071-1