Abstract
Sometimes it’s not certain which of several mutually exclusive moral views is correct. Like almost everyone, I think that there’s some sense in which what one should do depends on which of these theories is correct, plus the way the world is non-morally. But I also think there’s an important sense in which what one should do depends upon the probabilities of each of these views being correct. Call this second claim “moral uncertaintism”. In this paper, I want to address an argument against moral uncertaintism offered in the pages of this journal by Brian Weatherson, and seconded elsewhere by Brian Hedden, the crucial premises of which are: (1) that acting on moral uncertaintist norms necessarily involves motivation by reasons or rightness as such, and (2) that such motivation is bad. I will argue that (1) and (2) are false, and that at any rate, the quality of an agent’s motivation is not pertinent to the truth or falsity of moral uncertaintism in the way that Weatherson’s and Hedden’s arguments require.
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Notes
The useful locution “It’s not certain” (as opposed to “S is not certain”) expresses a claim about epistemic probabilities—specifically, the claim that no spoken-of proposition has an epistemic probability of 1. Statements about epistemic probabilities express, rather than report, credences, and as such epistemic probabilities may well diverge from credences. Meta-semantic views about epistemic probability statements are a big deal in the philosophy of language (Yalcin 2007; Moss 2013), but this work is just starting to penetrate the ethical literature on action under uncertainty. In my opinion, someone sympathetic to the view I defend in this paper avoids several pitfalls by focusing on epistemic probabilities of moral propositions, rather than subjective or objective probabilities thereof. I argue for this in Sepielli 2012 and 2014a. At any rate, the reader of this paper should understand “probabilities” and “chances” as referring to epistemic probabilities; by implication, the reader should not make the mistake of understanding such talk as referring to the agent’s own credences.
I also think that that what we should do depends on the probabilities of various non-moral propropositions being true. In so saying, I’m using another, probably more familiar, “subjective” sense of “should”. To be clear: I am not simply defining the various senses of “should” here, but rather making stronger claims about how, as a matter of substantive moral theory, these senses apply.
Harman argues that moral ignorance (of which moral uncertainty is one variety) does not exculpate, and so there is no important sense in which what I ought to depends on the probabilities of moral propositions. My reply to Harman may be found in Sepielli (ms).
Terminating a pregnancy is probably not the best example of something that might be wrong to do but is certainly permissible not to do; after all, there are plausible arguments that carrying a pregnancy to term is the riskier option. See, e.g., Harman (1999).
Weatherson uses “rational” rather than “subjectively prudent”. Since “rational” is used by different philosophers in different ways, I prefer to stick with the neologism. Nothing of significance rides on this choice, though.
Similarly, someone who executes a material inference does not employ as premises the claims that would transform her inference into a formally valid one. But she is rationally committed to them all the same.
One might similarly ask, “Would Martha drive all the way to the grocery store if she doesn’t believe it’s open?”, which may well elicit a negative answer. But if we fill in the story a bit more, and say that she nonetheless has some credence that the store is open, her driving there is perfectly intelligible.
In any case, the claim that one cannot be motivated by F unless one values F simpliciter does not entail that no one uncertain about the value of F can be motivated by it. For one can value F simpliciter while being uncertain about just how valuable it is relative to other features. And indeed, many cases of moral uncertainty are of just this type -- e.g. a medical review board is uncertain of how considerations of patient autonomy trade off against considerations of patient well-being. It is not clear from Weatherson's paper why an uncertaintist agent in such a case could not be correctly described as motivated by autonomy and well-being, rather than by the prospect of rightness. Thanks to a referee for this suggestion.
The contrast at work here is between the second-personal notion of “wronging” someone and the third-personal notion of “doing wrong”. See, e.g., Darwall (2006).
Thanks to a referee for help here.
(Weatherson’s focus on certain class of uncertaintist norms (i.e. those enjoining moral recklessness) may lead some readers to think that other uncertaintist norms (e.g. those prescribing action in cases where there is no morally “safe” option) are beyond the reach of his argument. But it is a mistake to think this. His argument applies to all uncertaintist norms that we can use to guide action. As such, if his motivational arguemnt were correct, the only alternative to fetishism would be what I’ve called a “leap of faith”.
I owe this astute point to an anonymous referee.
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This research was funded by a University of Toronto Connaught Junior Researcher Award.
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Sepielli, A. Moral uncertainty and fetishistic motivation. Philos Stud 173, 2951–2968 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0645-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0645-z