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Intuitions in philosophy: a minimal defense

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References

  • Bealer, G. (1992). The incoherence of empiricism. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary (Vol. 66, pp. 99–138).

  • Bengson, J. (forthcoming). The intellectual given. Mind.

  • Cappelen, H. (2012). Philosophy without intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Herman Cappelen, Dan Marshall, and an audience at the Institute of Philosophy in London for discussion.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

    David J. Chalmers

  2. New York University, New York, USA

    David J. Chalmers

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  1. David J. Chalmers
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Correspondence to David J. Chalmers.

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Chalmers, D.J. Intuitions in philosophy: a minimal defense. Philos Stud 171, 535–544 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0288-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0288-x

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