Abstract
What is the relationship between the epistemic norms of assertion and the epistemic norms of action/practical reasoning? Brown argues that the epistemic standards for practical reasoning and assertion are distinct (Brown in Philos Phenomenol Res 84(1):123–157, 2012). In contrast, Montminy argues that practical reasoning and assertion must be governed by the same epistemic norm (Montminy in Pac Philos Quart 93(4):57–68, 2012). Likewise, McKinnon has articulated an argument for a unified account from cases of isolated second-hand knowledge (McKinnon in Logos Episteme 3(4):565–569, 2012). To clarify the issue, I articulate a distinction between Equivalence Commonality and Structural Commonality. I then argue against the former by counterexamples that doubly dissociate the epistemic standards for assertion and action. Furthermore, I argue that such a double dissociation compromises knowledge accounts of both assertion and action/practical reasoning. To provide a more accurate diagnosis, I consider speech act theory and argue that principled differences between the epistemic norms of action and assertion compromise Equivalence Commonality. In contrast, a qualified version of Structural Commonality may be preserved.
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Notes
For the present purpose, I treat the epistemic norms of action and practical reasoning as relevantly similar although this is, for a number of reasons, a simplification (Gerken 2011a, fn. 2). However, the discussion will not assume inferentialism according to which every intentional action is based on practical reasoning. Nor will it assume a correspondence thesis according to which there is a corresponding line of practical reasoning for every intentional action (these notions are due to Audi 2006. See also Montminy 2012).
Action and assertion are also intertwined when the assertion is about how to act. For the most part, I set aside this special case since it requires special attention (see Maitra and Weatherson 2010 for an interesting discussion).
However, Montminy does not directly address all of Brown’s arguments.
Of course, someone might uphold only a knowledge norm that claims the necessity of knowledge or one that claims the sufficiency of knowledge. But since the rationale for the commitment to Equivalence Commonality will be similar, I consider the biconditional accounts (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008).
Smithies’ JK Rule is not intended to be as hyper-intellectualized as it may seem. This is because the higher-order justification in question is only propositional, rather than doxastic, justification. I do not accept Smithies, overly de-psychologized conception of propositional justification (Gerken 2011a, Sect. 5). But I will not engage in criticism of it here because I primarily invoke the JK Rule to illustrate that it is not only knowledge first theorists who appear to be rationally committed to Equivalence Commonality.
This depends in part on the nature of the requirement expressed by the ‘One must:’ clause in (MRA). Thanks to Jessica Brown and Martin Montminy.
Likewise, you cannot rely on p in a line of practical reasoning that concludes that you should push button C. So, here the simplifying equivocation of the epistemic norms of action and practical reasoning appears to be benign. Note that the case is not a clear-cut counterexample to weaker claims about the relationship between assertion and action. For example, Maitra and Weatherson articulate their Action Rule as follows: “Assert that p only if acting as p is true is the thing for you to do” (Maitra and Weatherson 2010). Depending on the interpretation of “the thing for you to do” and individuation of deliberative context, The Action Rule may be consistent with QUIZ SHOW.
The literature contains several intriguing cases which might figure in similar arguments. An anonymous referee notes McKinnon’s case of (purportedly warranted) insincere assertion and Lackey’s cases of self-less assertion (McKinnon 2013; Lackey 2007).
Likewise, it seems reasonable to rely on the assumption as a premise in practical reasoning, concluding that you should set the trap in question. So, again the differences between action and practical reasoning seem benign.
However, it is worth mentioning that reflection on excuses is sometimes invoked in response to similar cases. The general idea is, roughly, that apparent counterexamples to some norm may be explained by assuming that the norm is in fact violated although the agent is excused in violating it. Variations of this “excuse maneuver” are especially invoked by knowledge first theorists (DeRose 2002, Hawthorne and Stanley 2008). However, it is not clear that an excuse maneuver may be developed as a plausible response to the present cases. More generally, I have argued at some length that the excuse maneuver is beset with problems (Gerken 2011a, Sect. 4–6. See also Lackey 2007). In the absence of a response to these arguments, it is not clear that an appeal to excuses can provide a good response to the present cases.
Moreover, similar direct counterexamples need not depend on differing aims between action and assertion.
Thanks to Jessica Brown.
Here I construe (1b) as a declarative speech act. It may also be construed as a directive speech act which constitutes the recommendation not to admit Mr. X (Bach and Harnish 1979). A single assertion may have both of these communicative functions (in Gerken MS I consider the relationship between them).
I do not pursue a comprehensive discussion of the aims of assertion on this occasion. Likewise, I will not seek to settle the complex relationship between the aims of assertion and action, respectively, and the norms thereof. Rather, I merely seek to make the more modest point—exemplified by implicature cases—that assertive speech acts have distinctive aims that are not shared by action in general. A comprehensive discussion of the aims of assertion and their relationship to norms of assertion would require, among other things, a discussion of assertion’s epistemic aims. This is a very complex issue and connecting it to the present one in a responsible manner would require a paper of its own. For example, there is no consensus in the literature as to whether assertion has a constitutive epistemic aim—i.e., to express some epistemic position. Moreover, there is no clarity about the nature of the purported aim—i.e., the nature of said epistemic position. Even theorists who agree that, for example, expressing knowledge is a constitutive aim of assertion come to very different conclusions about the norm of assertion. An anonymous referee points to the complexity of the issue by noting that both McKinnon and Sosa uphold the view that assertion has the constitutive aim of expressing knowledge but come to very different conclusions about the norms of assertion (Sosa 2011; McKinnon 2013. Turri 2011 is also relevant in this context). I have argued that the reflection on the epistemic norm of action suggests that epistemic norms are, in general, not constitutively associated with knowledge (Gerken 2011a, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, Sect. 5). But in order to focus on the present—and more restricted—point that assertive speech acts have communicative aims that non-linguistic actions lack, I postpone further discussion of the broader issue about the aims of assertion.
Thanks to Kent Bach for discussion.
This is a controversial claim that knowledge first theorists will resist. I agree that some cases of isolated second-hand knowledge are counterexamples to the sufficiency of knowledge for assertion. But the considerations contra knowledge first norms below are independent of this claim. Moreover, the points made in this section could be restated mutatis mutandis by substituting ‘isolated second-hand knowledge’ with ‘isolated second-hand evidence/warrant/justification.’
McKinnon does not explicate her notion of a “unified norm.” So, it is not clear whether she takes the phenomenon of isolated second-hand knowledge to provide a rationale for Equivalence Commonality or Structural Commonality (or some other way of thinking about a unified norm). However, McKinnon’s aim is not to defend a unified norm but to outline a potential rationale for it. My interest is how the phenomenon of isolated second-hand knowledge bears on Equivalence Commonality and Structural Commonality. Thanks Rachel McKinnon for clarifying her aim.
Thanks to Rachel McKinnon for clarifying this.
As mentioned above, these phenomena put equally strong pressure on non-knowledge theorists, such as Smithies, who also appear to be committed to Equivalence Commonality.
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Acknowledgments
Thanks to Jessica Brown, Rachel McKinnon and Martin Montminy for comments on the paper and correspondences that clarified both interpretive and substantive issues. For discussion about related issues, I am grateful to Kent Bach, Adam Carter, Emma Gordon, Nat Hansen, Anders Schoubye and Andreas Stokke. Thanks to the ever-patient Julie. The title was inspired by a trip to Laos – and by Neelam!
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Gerken, M. Same, same but different: the epistemic norms of assertion, action and practical reasoning. Philos Stud 168, 725–744 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0156-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0156-0