Abstract
The luck argument raises a serious challenge for libertarianism about free will. In broad outline, if an action is undetermined, then it appears to be a matter of luck whether or not one performs it. And if it is a matter of luck whether or not one performs an action, then it seems that the action is not performed with free will. This argument is most effective against event-causal accounts of libertarianism. Recently, Franklin (Philosophical Studies 156:199–230, 2011) has defended event-causal libertarianism against four formulations of the luck argument. I will argue that three of Franklin’s responses are unsuccessful and that there are important versions of the luck challenge that his defense has left unaddressed.
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Notes
Roughly, event-causal accounts can be contrasted with agent-causal and non-causal accounts. Traditional libertarianism can be distinguished from source libertarianism, where the former requires, very roughly, the ability to do otherwise and the latter that one is the source of one’s choices.
In what follows, some claims will be formulated only in terms of action, others will be formulated only in terms of choice, for ease of presentation. As mentioned, I assume, as it is common in this debate, that choices are mental actions, and I shall assume that one may in all instances substitute “making a choice” for “performance of an action”, and vice versa.
Again, one may substitute “(making) a choice” for “(performance of) an action” in this argument. See note 2.
References
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Acknowledgments
The research for this article was conducted while I was a research fellow at the University of Leiden and funded by a grant from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). Earlier versions were presented at a workshop on the theoretical aspects of indeterminism and agency and at a research seminar, both at the University of Utrecht. I would like to thank participants for their helpful comments.
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Schlosser, M.E. The luck argument against event-causal libertarianism: It is here to stay. Philos Stud 167, 375–385 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0102-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0102-1