Abstract
Most philosophers since Sidgwick have thought that the various forms of pleasure differ so radically that one cannot find a common, distinctive feeling among them. This is known as the heterogeneity problem. To get around this problem, the motivational theory of pleasure suggests that what makes an experience one of pleasure is our reaction to it, not something internal to the experience. I argue that the motivational theory is wrong, and not only wrong, but backwards. The heterogeneity problem is the principal source of motivation for this, otherwise, highly counterintuitive theory. I intend to show that the heterogeneity problem is not a genuine problem and that a more straightforward theory of pleasure is forthcoming. I argue that the various experiences that we call “pleasures” all feel good.
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Notes
Feldman (1997b, 2004) defends what he calls the “attitudinal theory of pleasure,” which holds that sensory pleasures are those that we are pleased to have. It is not entirely clear that his theory should be called a motivational theory, since it does not make reference to desire. Feldman’s theory avoids the problems facing any attempted reduction of pleasure to desire, but it suffers from the same Euthyphro-style problem as the motivational theory. In addition, it rests on a problematic distinction between attitudinal and sensory pleasures. Due to limitations of scope, I do not discuss Feldman’s theory in this paper.
Since Sidgwick (1981) does not say that pleasurable experiences are those that we do desire, but rather those that are apprehended as desirable, he does not clearly offer a motivational theory. Of course, it depends on how one cashes out the notion of “desirable.”
Sidgwick (1981, p. 127).
Brant (1979, p. 38). Brandt (1979, p. 41) also offers a more technical notion of pleasure in functionalist terms.
Gosling (1969, p. 65) develops these objections.
Alston (1968).
Carson (2000, p. 13).
Heathwood (2007a, p. 32).
This move also makes the motivational theory dependent on a highly suspect theory of desire. If not logically or even psychologically impossible to desire what one already has, it is, no doubt, exceedingly rare. Of course one might “want” something to stay the same, such as wanting to keep a sweater rather than give it away or wanting to keep one's car in the same spot when asked if we want to move it. Echoing Socrates’ argument in the Symposium, I think that Anthony Kenny is correct to point out that the “want” in such cases is just shorthand for “wanting to keep”, which is essentially a desire for a future state, something we don’t have (Kenny 1963, pp. 115–116). Sumner (1996, p. 129) makes the same point. Due to limitations of scope, I will not press this objection. For the sake of argument, I will assume that it makes sense to desire what we already have.
For an overview of the various positions, see Smuts (2009).
There are a variety of answers on the table to the paradox of painful art. Control theorists argue that the putative painfulness of some artworks is mitigated by our ability to stop experiencing them at will (Morreall 1985). Compensation theorists argue that any painful reactions must be compensated for by other pleasures, either in the craft of the narrative (Hume 1985) or in the awareness that we are sympathetic creatures responsive to the suffering of others (Feagin 1983). Conversion theorists argue that the overall experience of painful artworks is not one of pain but of pleasure, as the pain is converted into a larger, more pleasurable experience (Hume 1985). Power theorists argue that we enjoy the feeling of power that arises from either the realization of the endurance of humanity (Price 1998), or through the overcoming of our fear (Shaw 2007). Rich experience theorists argue that there are many reasons why people do things other than to feel pleasure. The overall experience of painful art may be one of pain, but the experience can still be seen as valuable, and, as such, motivating (Smuts 2007).
Heathwood (2007a, p. 35).
I attempt to account for the value of sad songs in a similar way. See Smuts (2010).
More importantly, the problem hits several other formalizations of the motivational theory: Sidgwick talks of “feelings.” Brandt, Alston, and Carson talk of “experiences,” and so does nearly everyone else. It is potentially misleading to talk of sensations as pleasurable. It risks loosing sight of the fact that it is sensory experiences that are pleasurable. I will return to this when discussing the Problem of Changing Tastes.
I find this example more compelling than others that have been discussed in the literature, such as Feldman's Dizzy Doctor and masochists. Rachels (2000, p. 194) discusses an intriguing example from Roger Trigg of someone who likes but takes no pleasure from tonguing a sore tooth.
Kagan (1992, p. 174) sets up a contrast between reductionist and nonreductionist theories of pleasure based on how they account for intensity.
I say “partly,” because the intensity of desire does not always correspond to the intensity of actual or, even expected, satisfaction.
Again, Heathwood's theory only applies to sensations. I am assuming a natural extension of the view to include all pleasurable experiences. Nothing here rides on this point.
The most obvious counter-example, sexual desire, is not so obviously pleasurable. Sexual fantasy and anticipation may be pleasurable, but sexual desire is not. Edwards (1979, p. 94) disagrees.
Perhaps it is not the intensity of the desire that correlates with pleasure, but the intensity of our felt satisfaction. The theory would have to be that the satisfaction of a contemporaneous desire is the pleasure. But this would threaten to make the motivational theory an internalist theory. The felt satisfaction would be the common aspect internal to all pleasurable experiences. But this is not such a great candidate for the role. The problem is that we often describe desire satisfaction as pleasurable. However, if the motivational theory accounts for the intensity of pleasure based on the intensity of satisfaction, we will no longer be able to describe desire satisfaction as pleasurable. There is no way to account for the value of satisfaction without an infinite regress: saying that we experienced pleasure would amount to saying that we experienced the pleasure of a satisfaction, which would amount to saying that we had a experienced pleasure, which would….
Edwards (1979, p. 95) discusses a related regress problem.
This is Feldman’s view. At least, he thinks that our attitudes need not feel any particular way. They are more like beliefs than sensations. He argues that sensory pleasures are those that we have a particular kind of pro-attitude toward, those we are pleased to be having. He calls occurrent episodes of these kinds of pro-attitudes attitudinal pleasure. See Feldman (1992, p. 56).
Rachels (2000, pp. 192–196) discusses a related problem that our preferences are often stronger or weaker than the pleasure.
Mason (2007, p. 380) presents a few similar descriptive phrases: “a feeling of lightness and ease, a warm feeling in the stomach.”
Kagan (1992, pp. 172–173) uses the metaphor of the volume of a sound.
Broad (1959, pp. 228–230). Outside of Broad, I know of only one unambiguous, sustained defense of the hedonic tone theory of pleasure: Dunker (1941). Tännsjö (1998, pp. 65–67) also defends the hedonic tone view. There are more defenses of general internalism about pleasure, for instance: Moore (2004, pp. 12–13, 78) defends something like internalism; Goldstein (1985, pp. 49–55) presents what might be an internalist view; and Davis (1981) develops a form of internalism.
Sobel (2002, p. 254, n. 8) replies that although we can become more articulate about particular tastes we cannot about pleasure. I think that this response relies on a disanalogy. Pleasure is to experience as taste is to eating. We can get more articulate about a particular eating experience or a pleasurable experience, but not taste or pleasure in general.
Goldstein (1985, p. 51) makes a similar point.
This mistake is the source of Feldman’s second question about pleasure—what is the relationship between attitudinal and sensory pleasure? See Feldman (1997b). If I am right, there is no essential difference between attitudinal and sensory pleasures. Similarly, Crisp (2006, p. 102, n. 22) argues that mere attitudes are not appropriate candidates for pleasure. Although she does not reject the distinction, Mason (2007, pp. 382, 384, 386) concurs. For a reply, see Feldman (2007). Davis (1981, pp. 306–308) makes a relevant distinction between “making happy” and being “happy that.” The latter, much like states about which we are “pleased that” are mere attitudes. They are not experiences.
I owe this objection to Chris Heathwood, who raised it in his commentary on my paper at the first annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress at the University of Colorado at Boulder, August 2008.
Csikszentmihaly (1990).
Feldman (1992, pp. 58–59) discusses a similar case, but draws a very different conclusion.
Feldman (2004, pp. 64–65) develops a similar, wonderful.
I assume that there are qualia.
Feldman (2004, pp. 83–85) describes a similar shower example. He argues that only an externalist theory of pleasure can solve the problem.
I thank Chris Heathwood for forcing me to clarify my form of internalism about pleasure.
Rachels (2004, p. 200) makes a similar claim.
As for the analog with pain, I am not convinced that there are putatively painless pains. We should not be so trusting of the phenomenal reports of people high on drugs. For further criticism, see Rachels (2004, p. 199). Taking the opposite approach: Bengtsson (2004) argues that there is a dissimilarity between pleasure and pain: There are non-bothering pains, but no non-appealing pleasures. It would take me too far afield to deal with this issue here.
Heathwood (2007b).
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Acknowledgements
I thank Chris Heathwood for two sets of extensive comments on previous drafts of this paper. I also thank that audience at the first annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress in 2007 for feedback on an earlier draft of this paper. In particular, I thank Fred Feldman for raising several difficult objections. I also thank the audience at the Eastern division meeting of the American Society of Aesthetics in April 2009, where I delivered an early version of this paper. In addition, I thank Heidi Bollich for discussing an early draft.
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Smuts, A. The feels good theory of pleasure. Philos Stud 155, 241–265 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9566-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9566-4