Abstract
I argue that recent virtue theories (including those of Hursthouse, Slote, and Swanton) face important initial difficulties in accommodating the supererogatory. In particular, I consider several potential characterizations of the supererogatory modeled upon these familiar virtue theories (and their accounts of rightness) and argue that they fail to provide an adequate account of supererogation. In the second half of the paper I sketch an alternative virtue-based characterization of supererogation, one that is grounded in the attitudes of virtuous ideal observers, and that avoids the concerns raised in the first part of the paper.
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Notes
Urmson (1958).
For deontologists against the possibility of supererogation, see Hale (1991), and Baron (1995). For a deontologist accommodating the supererogatory see McCarty (1989). For consequentialist accommodations of supererogation, see Zimmerman (1993), and Portmore (2003). Finally, for a denial that consequentialism can accommodate supererogation, see McConnell (1980).
Trianosky (1986, p. 31).
On a strict virtue ethics, judgments about character or virtue are seen as basic or primary, in that concepts of moral rightness or goodness are to be explained and understood in terms of character or virtue.
I will treat ‘saint’, ‘hero’, and ‘fully virtuous agent’ as largely interchangeable for purposes of this paper, though obviously there are other contexts in which these ought to be distinguished.
Brännmark defends such a proposal. See his (2006, p. 596).
It might be objected that no virtues would be involved in choosing to sleep at a given time, and thus we need not count such behavior as supererogatory. But minor exercises of virtues (such as prudence) could easily be involved. And the problem is that even if some slight exercise of prudence were involved, sleeping when a virtuous agent would characteristically do so hardly seems supererogatory (barring a highly-gerrymandered scenario).
Brännmark defends a similar view, holding that an action is morally wrong iff it is one that no decent person would characteristically do in the circumstances. See Brännmark (2006, p. 596); decent people are not saints on his account. Brännmark in turn suggests that an action would be obligatory iff it would be wrong not to do it. Thus, an action would be obligatory iff all decent people would characteristically do it in the circumstances. Finally, he holds an action would be permissible iff some decent person would do it in the circumstances. The worries developed in the following paragraphs apply to these proposals, mutatis mutandis.
We could hold that such agents are not morally blameworthy, given their non-culpable ignorance (they had no reason to suspect the wine was poisoned). But this is quite different from treating the actions themselves as morally permissible.
Swanton (2003, p. 241).
Swanton (2003, p. 239).
Swanton (2004, p. 177).
Swanton (2004, p. 187).
Swanton (2004, p. 182).
Slote (2003, p. 133).
See Johnson (2003).
Aristotle might have allowed for a solution along these lines. He writes: “Still, we are not blamed if we deviate a little in excess or deficiency from doing well, but only if we deviate a long way, since then we are easily noticed. But how far and how much we must deviate to be blamed is not easy to define in an account” (1985, II, ix, 1109b18–22). This would appear to give us space for the supererogatory—cases in which it is not blameworthy to be off of the mean. Still, Aristotle does not expand on this, and seems to have in mind epistemic worries (i.e., that it can be hard to tell exactly what is required of us), rather than allowing for action that goes beyond what is required.
One could treat full-information as consisting in knowledge of all facts relevant to the given case. See, for example, Carson (1984, p. 58). Alternatively, one could simply attribute omniscience (or perhaps all possible true beliefs) to the observer, thereby avoiding questions of relevance.
This is not to endorse such accounts (indeed, they face important difficulties), but they are familiar and can serve adequately for immediate purposes.
That is, the observer would not want the action to be performed simply because of its aesthetic features, etc.
See Hale (1991, pp. 279–281).
Heyd (1982, p. 175).
‘Typically’ as there may be circumstances where punishment might be appropriate. For example, an individual might be a member of a religious order with a certain set of moral ideals (which would not be seen as required by most virtuous ideal observers), where there are established punishments for those members who fail to live up to these ideals.
Gregory Mellema argues for a class of actions, the ‘quasi-supererogatory’, which are non-obligatory, praiseworthy to perform, but also blameworthy to omit. See his (1991), and (1996). For other authors who embrace the possibility that a failure to perform certain supererogatory actions is blameworthy (or suitable for feeling shame), see Badhwar (1985), and Humberstone (1974).
Hale (1991, p. 282).
Note that an idealized Gandhi could consider certain other actions to be supererogatory even for his followers—he is not restricted to only embracing morally required actions for his followers. Still, the more challenging cases are those where a particular virtuous ideal observer would deem certain actions to be required while other virtuous ideal observers would deem them to be supererogatory.
Manion (2002, p. 77).
Williams (1993, pp. 92–93). The passage is quoted in Manion (2002, p. 76).
Manion (2002, p. 76).
If, for example, the moral ideal at stake requires tremendous acts of charity, and an agent fails to live up to these rules, she might appropriately feel shame (for her failure to act in accordance with the rules, thus failing to live up to her ideals), and guilt (as she thinks of the continuing suffering of those she has failed to assist in failing to live up to her ideals).
For discussion of issues in character development and culpable vice, see Jacobs (2001).
These comments fall broadly in line with similar suggestions to be found in recent work by others. Mellema emphasizes the possibility of agents having greater responsibilities in areas in which they have a vocation in his (1991, Chap. 5). Flescher argues more broadly for a duty to develop ones virtues in his (2003), as does Swanton in her (2004). See also Norton (1988).
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank commentators and audience members for their comments, especially Robert Johnson, Nixie Knox, Jonathan Kvanvig, Matthew McGrath, James Montmarquet, and Robert C. Roberts. Paul McNamara and an anonymous referee also provided very helpful comments. Work on the paper was completed while I was a visiting fellow at the Centre for Ethics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs at the University of St. Andrews; I would like to thank the Centre, and its director, John Haldane, for this support.
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Kawall, J. Virtue theory, ideal observers, and the supererogatory. Philos Stud 146, 179–196 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9250-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9250-0