Abstract
In recent years, speech-act theory has mooted the possibility that one utterance can signify a number of different things. This pluralist conception of signification lies at the heart of Thomas Bradwardine’s solution to the insolubles, logical puzzles such as the semantic paradoxes, presented in Oxford in the early 1320s. His leading assumption was that signification is closed under consequence, that is, that a proposition signifies everything which follows from what it signifies. Then any proposition signifying its own falsity, he showed, also signifies its own truth and so, since it signifies things which cannot both obtain, it is simply false. Bradwardine himself, and his contemporaries, did not elaborate this pluralist theory, or say much in its defence. It can be shown to accord closely, however, with the prevailing conception of logical consequence in England in the fourteenth century. Recent pluralist theories of signification, such as Grice’s, also endorse Bradwardine’s closure postulate as a plausible constraint on signification, and so his analysis of the semantic paradoxes is seen to be both well-grounded and plausible.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
This passage occurs in an additional chapter found in only two of the thirteen manuscripts: see §2 below.
Bradwardine (2008) §ad A.4.3: “It must be said that any proposition signifying itself not to be true or itself to be false necessarily signifies itself to be true, as was decisively shown above by the second thesis.”
See (Martin 1984: p. 4)
The Latin terms are simpliciter (absolutely) and ut nunc (as a matter of fact).
Explicit Insolubilium tractatus Magistri Thome de Anglia (“Here end the Insolubles of Master Thomas of England”).
The Latin terms are significare precise (signify exactly) and pretendere (say explicitly).
The Latin terms are ex impossibili quodlibet and necessarium ad quodlibet, respectively.
The Latin terms are consequentia formalis de forma (formal consequence in form) and consequentia formalis de materia (formal consequence in matter).
The Latin terms contrast signifying naturaliter (naturally) as against ad placitum or voluntarie (conventionally).
Grice (1989): pp. 214–215.
Grice (1989): p. 349; cf. p. 291.
Ockham (William of Ockham 1974) I 1 p. 8: “And in this way a sound signifies naturally, just as any effect signifies at least its cause, and also just as the barrel-hoop signifies wine in the tavern.”
References
Adams, M. M. (1987). William Ockham, Two vols. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Andjelković, M., & Williamson, T. (2000). Truth, falsity and borderline cases. Philosophical Topics, 28, 211–244.
Ashworth, E. J., & Spade, P. V. (1992). Logic in late medieval Oxford. In J. Catto & T. Evans (Eds.), The history of the University of Oxford: Late Medieval Oxford (Vol. II, pp. 35–64). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do things with words. J. O. Urmson (Ed.) Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Boler, J. (2005). Ockham on the concept. Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 11, 65–86.
Bradwardine, T. (2008). Insolubilia. S. Read (Ed.), Dallas medieval texts and translations. Leuven: Peeters.
Buridan, J. (1976). Iohannis Buridani Tractatus de Consequentiis. H. Hubien (Ed.) Louvain: Publications Universitaires.
Cappelen, H., & Lepore, E. (2005). Insensitive semantics: A defense of semantic minimalism and speech act pluralism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Dutilh-Novaes, C. (2008). Tarski’s hidden theory of meaning: Sentences say exactly one thing. In S. Rahman, T. Tulenheimo, & E. Genot (Eds.), Essays on the Liar. Springer Verlag.
Field, H. (2006). Truth and the unprovability of consistency. Mind, 115, 567–605.
Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. Philosophical review, 66, 377–388. (References are to the reprint in [Grice 1989].)
Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the way of words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P.
Martin, R. L. (1984). Recent essays on truth and the Liar paradox. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Maudlin, T. (2004). Truth and paradox. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Peter of Mantua. (1983). Treatise on knowing and being uncertain (Tractatus de Scire et Dubitare), from Logica Petri Mantuani, Venice: 1492 (ff. ivB–k4A), tr. Ivan Boh. Stillwater, OK: Translation Clearing House.
Quinton, A. M. (1973). The nature of things. London: Routledge.
Roure, M.-L. (1970). La problématique des propositions insolubles au XIIIe siècle et au début du XIVe, suivie de l’édition des traités de W. Shyreswood, W. Burleigh et Th. Bradwardine. Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, 37, 205–326.
Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech acts. Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.
Spade, P. V. (1974). Five logical tracts by Richard Lavenham. In J. Reginald O’Donnell (Ed.), Essays in honour of Anton Charles Pegis (pp. 70–113). Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies.
Spade, P. V. (1976). Robert Fland’s Consequentiae: An edition. Mediaeval Studies, 38, 54–84.
Spade, P. V. (1978). Robert Fland’s Insolubilia: An edition, with comments on the dating of Fland’s works. Mediaeval Studies, 40, 56–80.
Spade, P. V. (1981). Insolubilia and Bradwardine’s theory of signification. Medioevo, 7, 115–134. (Reprinted in [Spade 1988].)
Spade, P. V. (1988). Lies, language and logic in the late middle ages. London: Variorum.
Stevenson, C. L. (1944). Ethics and language. New Haven: Yale U.P.
William of Ockham. (1974). Summa Logicae. P. Boehner, G. Gál, & S. Brown (Eds.) St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Read, S. Plural signification and the Liar paradox. Philos Stud 145, 363–375 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9236-y
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9236-y